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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a case study which reviews the
chronological events surrounding the Naval Postgraduate
School's (NPS) 1990 mainframe computer procurement. The focus
is on the issues which resulted in a protest in 1989 by
PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., a systems integrator in the high-
technology computer industry. The protest led to a one year
delay in which NPS was required to start the procurement
process over from the beginning. The major finding is that
requesting agencies seldom make major automated data
processing equipment (ADPE) procurements and, as a result, may
not be fully informed of market trends and industry politics.
This can lead to personnel unfamiliar with the current trends
in an ever-changing procurement system. Major recommendations
include restructuring the procurement process to include
extensive training for activities procuring ADPE and
emphasizing a Navy philosophy of procuring the "best-value"
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This thesis documents the chronology of events, personnel
actions, and related activities which eventually resulted in
the procurement of a mainframe computer for the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) in 1990. It is presented in a case
study format and covers the period from 1985-1990.
B. METHODOLOGY
A case study is a description of a real situation that
occurred in a real organization. The focus or purpose of a
case study is on one or several key issues, decisions, or
problems requiring a solution [Ref. l:p. 1]. The focus of
this case study is on the decisions and actions pertaining to
the procurement of a mainframe computer and the relevant
actions of the cognizant federal agencies.
A case study has been shown to be an effective method for
presenting valuable insight into the constant technological
change and innovative characteristics of the information
systems management field and their effects on management and
organizational change [Ref. l:p. 2].
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C. BACKGROUND
The case study documents the NPS 1990 mainframe computer
procurement. The procurement was required by NPS to replace
outdated International Business Machines (IBM) 3033, models AP
and U mainframe computers. These computers incorporate the
IBM 370 architecture and were installed in the school's
Computer Center in the early 1980s. The mainframe computers
support all of the school's general computing requirements and
the data base and management information systems of the
command's major tenant activity, the Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC).
DMDC's mission is to support the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (SecDef) with computer-based studies and analyses,
and operate Department of Defense (DoD) automated personnel
systems. DMDC's principal application is the Defense
Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) for health-
care and other services for all military personnel (active,
retired, and their dependents).
Procurement activity began in 1987 with the formation of
the NPS Mainframe Replacement Committee. At that time, it was
expected that the entire ptocurement replacing both IBM 3033
models would be completed by September 1989. However, in
April 1989, as the request for proposal (RFP) response
deadline was approaching, PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., a computer
systems integrator, protested the procurement to the General
Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA). In their protest
2
they alleged that the solicitation by NPS was biased in favor
of IBM. The GSBCA will also be referred to as "the Board"
throughout the thesis.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research seeks to answer three key questions. The
first question asks what were the key actions and decisions
taken by management at NPS for the 1990 mainframe procurement.
The second question asks what are the key events of the ADPE
acquisition process normally undertaken by Government
managerial decision-makers once the need to procure new
equipment is determined. The tertiary question lends itself
to determining what factors led to the procurement delays,
alternatives available, and lessons learned by agencies
involved in this particular procurement.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
The thesis is organized into eight chapters and seven
appendices. Chapter II describes the case methodology used,
the methodology's relevance as a teaching and research
strategy, and the methodology's advantages and disadvantages.
Chapter III contains background information on ADP protests.
Chapter IV contains the case study documenting the
procurement. Chapter V is an analysis of the case study which
includes problems discerned by various key Government agencies
responsible for federal ADPE procurements. Chapter VI
3
provides lessons learned based on the case analysis. Chapter
VII contains conclusions and recommendations as related to the
thesis research questions. Appendix A summarizes key events
of the NPS mainframe procurement. Appendix B, figure one is
a diagram depicting the Center's IBM system configuration
prior to the 1990 mainframe procurement. Appendix C, figure
one is a diagram depicting the post-procurement system
configuration. Appendix D displays the typical Navy ADP
acquisition process. Appendix E c .ntains the PacifiCorp
Capital, Inc. letter of protest to the GSBCA. Appendix F
contains the summary of protest issues and actions taken by





This chapter addresses the thesis case methodology. The
use and benefits of a case study for research and teaching
purposes is explored. The advantages and disadvantages of a
case study in comparison with other research methods is also
discussed.
B. CASE STUDY FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES
A definition of a case study used for research purposes is
as follows:
A case study is an empirical inquiry that:
* investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real
life context; when
* the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident; and
" multiple sources of evidence are used. [Ref. l:p. 5]
Using this definition, case study research stands on its
own as a research strategy. Prior to this definition, a
common misconception held by those uneducated in case
methodology was that research strategies were of a hierarchial
nature. Case studies were considered as being at the bottom
part of the hierarchy. Their use was, for ths most part, a
preliminary to other types of research. Consequently, case
5
study usage was primarily limited to the exploratory stage of
research. Case studies were also viewed as consisting of only
one small part of the above definition, that of investigating
a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context. Such
an instance is evident when case studies are used to only
analyze decisions, processes or events. [Ref. l:p. 6]
There are five recognized research strategies within the
social sciences. They are: experiment, survey, archival
analysis, history and case study. Experiments, history and
case studies are research strategies that apply to a "how" or
"why" type of research question. Experiments focus on
contemporary phenomena, but require control over behavioral
events. History does not focus on contemporary phenomena and
also does not require control over behavioral events. As
previously defined, a case study focuses on contemporary
phenomena in which there is no control over behavioral events.
The only difference between history and case study research
strategies, besides the focus of the research, past versus
present, is that case study researchers have an advantage of
adding direct observation and interviews to their research
methodology. [Ref. l:p. 7]
Views on conducting research have evolved to a point that
each different type of research strategy is viewed as "a
different way of collecting and analyzing empirical evidence."
These views have evolved from the narrow niche given to case
studies and the wide, prescriptive view given to experiments.
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The best type of research strategy is now recognized to be
that based on the subject matter and the research purposes.
It is generally accepted that there are three different
purposes of research; exploratory, descriptive or explanatory.
Each research strategy may be used regardless of the purpose.
Strategy selection depends on the following three conditions:
(1) type of research question; (2) extent of control over
behavioral events; (3) focus on contemporary or historical
events. [Ref. l:p. 6]
The case study as a research strategy has been used in
many different areas:
" policy, political science, and public administration
research;
* community psychology and sociology;
" organizational and management studies;
* city and regional planning research, such as studies of
plans, neighborhoods or public agencies. ...... [Ref. l:p.
11]
The use of case study research has also proven valuable to
the information systems domain. Change and innovation have an
impact on management and organizational issues in an
information systems department. Case study research has been
able to provide valuable insights into these issues. [Ref.
l:p. 11]
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C. CASE STUDIES FOR TEACHING PURPOSES
According to Dorothy Robyn, "there are two criteria
potentially present in any learning situation." These two
criteria are the content or specific knowledge to be learned
and the learning process. The learning process concerns
itself with presenting a general approach or methodology to
problem solving and decision making. For instance, a
student's knowledge and ability to deal with the reality of
life outside the classroom is dependent on both of these
criteria. [Ref. l:p. 12)
Case studies basically follow the principle of "learning
by doing." Case studies present real life with all of its
associated complexity. Experience with case studies provides
students with exposure to a wide range of real life situations
which could take a lifetime to experience personally. This
experience offers a basis for comparison should the student
run into a similar situation outside the classroom [Ref. l:p.
12).
Generally, a classroom setting presents facts and
situations which have only one right answer. A student in a
lecture/classroom environment is a receiver of facts. Real
life deals with situations in which not all the relevant facts
of a decision are available or in which a decision is not
straight forward in that there is no right solution. "Case
studies are valuable lessons in teaching students the habits
of diagnosing problems, analyzing and evaluating alternatives
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and formulating workable plans of action." Additionally,
students must learn that decisions are not just made from an
analysis of the facts. "The decision is a political
process... involving power and influence." [Ref. l:p. 12]
Using case studies in learning situations provides a
student with an opportunity to apply theory to a situation
within the safety of a classroom environment. In essence a
case study is a "simulated experience." An additional benefit
is an ability to apply known theory to contemporary happenings
to see if a theory holds true. If it doesn't, there is
opportunity to search for reasons for a cause and effect.
Debates between students over a cause, effect and solution to
case study problems provides the benefits of requiring them to
question their assumptions and to defend their positions on
issues. Other benefits include teaching students the
following skills: how to search for facts, choose between
alternatives, and determining the essential questions to ask.
(Ref. l:p. 13]
Retired Navy Admiral Stansfield Turner believes strongly
in using case studies in a military classroom. He says, "Many
of the education programs, are simply cramming officers' heads
with facts rather than helping them to develop the skills to
deal with difficult problems of leadership, strategy and
management." Admiral Turner feels that using the case study
method "will help prepare students for the time when they rise
9
to the level where they really have to make decisions for our
country." [Ref. l:p. 13]
D. ADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
New situations, interactions and problems occur every day.
Case studies provide for a description of "holistic and
meaningful characteristics of such real life events as
individual lifecycles, organization and managerial processes,
neighborhood change, international relations, and maturation
of industries" [Ref. l:p. 7].
A unique strength of case study research is its ability to
use multiple sources of evidence in presenting data. Such
evidence includes documents, artifacts, interviews and
observations. This characteristic enables presentation of
data from all points of view and perception. Rarely does one
view of a situation contain all the pertinent facts
contributing to a situation. By having access to multiple
sources of evidence, the full story or explanation is easier
to piece together. Case study research allows a showcasing of
cause and effect factors of a situation or problem. With the
active observation of a case study researcher, many details
are provided in addition to available written documentation.
This facilitates an ability to document the possible causes
and effects in a relationship. [Ref. l:p. 8]
Another advantage can be found in the use of qualitative
data. Qualitative data is in the form of words, not the
10
numbers traditionally relied on. Qualitative data does have
some advantages over quantitative data. They are a "source of
well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes
occurring in local contexts." Words gleamed from interviews,
observations and documentation can indicate people's
attitudes, internal relations among personnel and relative
power and influence within an organization. Words possess a
quality of "undeniability" about them. "Words, organized into
incidents/stories provide a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavor
that often proves far more convincing to a reader... than a
page of numbers." [Ref. l:p. 8]
E. DISADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
A major difficulty contributing to acceptance of the case
study as a significant research strategy is that the data
gathered and analyzed are qualitative in nature. "Numbers
don't lie" is a popular cliche in support of quantitative
data.
This negative viewpoint is based primarily on two factors.
One factor is that words can have a variety of meanings. The
interpretation given to them by the researcher is viewed as a
possibility for bias. The numbers faction prefers experiments
where there is control over events. The results, in the form
of numbers, are interpreted the same by all analysts.
Secondly, there is a preference for being able to control
events which brings up the question of replicability. Would
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another person viewing the qualitative data of a case study
come up with the same conclusions? Would another researcher
be able to replicate the entire case study from data gathering
through analysis? The question concerning the replicability
of a case study adds a degree of uncertainty to the research
process. [Ref. l:p. 9]
Additional uncertainty comes from the lack of detail in
the documentation that case study researchers provide on their
methodology. Some past case study results have been found to
be influenced/biased by the researcher. A contributing factor
to this lack of documentation is the lack of accepted and
standardized methods for qualitative data analysis, and a lack
of a common language. [Ref. l:p. 10)
There are several other drawbacks to the case methodology.
The preparation of case studies is time consuming and their
documentation is voluminous. The fact that there is little
basis for scientific generalization is also considered a major
stumbling block. A typical skeptic of case study research,
who is immersed in the quantitative viewpoint, looks to
conclusions of the research to be generalizable to other
situations. This is not the intent of case study conclusions.
"Case study conclusions are generalizable to theoretical
propositions and not to populations or universes." They are
not even generalizable to other organizations. "In this sense
a case study does not represent a 'sample' and the
investigators' goal is to expand and generalize theories
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(analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies
(statistical generalization)." (Ref. l:p. 10]
An example of a case study giving emphasis to a
theoretical concept is the Cuban missile crisis. This exact
situation will never happen again, but there are general
lessons that can be learned. These lessons include "the
management of the problem, and the role of organizational
routine in shaping events and decisions." (Ref. l:p. 11]
F. METHODOLOGY OF THIS CASE STUDY
This case study concerns the series of events surrounding
an ADPE procurement which involved more than five years of
planning effort. Interviews and questionnaires were used in
acquiring thesis information. Interviews were conducted both
in person and via telephone and facsimile equipment. During
the interview phase, the typical questions posed were:
(1) In your opinion, what went wrong in the NPS procurement?
(2) What could NPS have done to avoid this protest scenario?
(3) What recommendations can you offer with regard to ADPE
acquisition that would inevitably aid other Government
agencies to minimize similar protest dilemmas in the future?
The questions posed and information sought was
predominantly from Department of the Navy (DoN) agencies
directly involved with the procurement. However, other
federal agencies, such as the Department of the Air Force,
Department of Justice, General Services Administration (GSA),
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Federal Systems Integration and Management (FEDSIM) Center,
and Naval Air Development Center (NAVAIRDEVCEN) were
contacted. Key individuals from these organizations provided
information regarding the case. High-level executives from
several of the mainframe computer industry's firms such as
IBM, Amdahl, VION, PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., were also
contacted for comments regarding the acquisition. Others
contacted for information included professors at both George
Washington University and New York University.
Most of the feedback received as a result of queries
regarding this case study were individual perceptions of the
overall process based on the outlook of the individual's
responsibility in the procurement process. The GSA had their
reasons why the procurement was protested as did everyone
else. However, there were several common threads that appear
to be factors in this mainframe computer acquisition. These
common factors will be discussed later in the chapter covering




This chapter is intended to give the reader background and
insight into ADP protests which may provide one an opportunity
to understand current industry trends. The views presented
belong to key individuals representing federal agencies
responsible for the effective and efficient procurement of
ADPE.
B. BACKGROUND
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 sets
forth a mechanism for bidders to protest the Government's
actions on a procurement. This protest mechanism brings
attorneys representing agencies and vendors together at a
hearing. Protests can be filed at any time after the
procurement is released to the public. Protests are typically
filed at three times:
(1) before the bids are due to protest the specifications;
(2) after the bids are received to protest being eliminated
from consideration before award;
(3) after the award is made to protest not receiving the
award.
Typically, when a protest is filed, the award is
suspended, revoked, or revised by the GSBCA. CICA requires
15
that protests be resolved within 45 working days. The GSBCA
is responsible for reviewing the protests and taking the
vendor(s) who presented them to task to ensure that frivolous
claims do not make their way to the decision table.
There are many possible outcomes to a protest. The GSBCA
can disallow the protest; can allow the procurement to stand
but award the protestor their proposal and legal costs; can
overturn the procurement (awarding the protester their
proposal and legal costs) and require the procurement to be
done all over again, etc.
It should be understood that a great deal of the time,
when the federal Government feels it cannot successfully
defend its position regarding ADP procurements in court, it
will settle a case out of court and may agree to pay court
costs and legal fees to the protesting vendor. This results
from the fact that vendors in industry pay highly trained and
specialized corporate lawyers to represent their protest cases
when they feel they have an opportunity to succeed. Federal
agencies on the other hand, maintain corps of general-purpose
legal counsels who are non-ADP procurement specialists.
Federal lawyers are not trained by the Government to be
specialists. Therefore, they stand a greater chance of defeat
during ADP protest proceedings. The following is a somewhat
opinionated quote from an industry source:
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"One billion dollars have gone to lawyers since the
GSBCA's inception. The protest mechanism was created by
lawyers for lawyers. The lawyers whc created the original
mechanism are now judges. Some of these same judges are
hearing the protest cases at the GSBCA. Industries often
have to intervene on behalf of the Government to ensure
that the contract or award won is maintained. Failure to
intervene at the critical time may spell disaster for a
company due to known Government ineptness." [Ref. 2]
Protests can be a multiparty suit. Most protests after
award are three-party suits; the award loser (protestor), the
Government (respondent) , and award winner (intcrvenor) . Other
offerors or the contract winner can offer to intervene on
behalf of the Government and often do. The "Gang of Six"
protest, which is presented to the reader in chapter IV, was
a multiparty suit in which a group six vendors decided to
collectively protest a Navy ADPE procurement on the grounds of
IBM-bias.
Each year, federal agencies collectively issue tens of
thousands of solicitations to procure a vast array of ADPE and
services. Statistically speaking, they do a good job and
perform well. Since 1985, only four-tenths of one percent of
all computer-related procurements have been protested through
the GSBCA. However, more recent events are disturbing.
Between 1988 and 1989 protests have increased 62 percent as
more vendors began using the Board's judicial forum. [Ref.
3:p. 48J
As computer technologies proliferate, federal technology
acquisitions increasingly involve lengthy and complex
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purchases. At the same time, federal budget dollars are
severely strained by fiscal cutbacks. [Ref. 3:p. 48]
Dr. Norman Brown of the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Navv for Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN (S & L))
states: "There is a common thread between agencies and
industries: the bigger the contract, the bigger the risk and
opportunity for protest." [Ref. 4]
David S. Cohen of Cohen & White in Washington, D.C., a
legal firm which specializes in Government high technology
contracts has stated that the protest system "relies on those
hurt to blow the whistle and bring their problems forward"
[Ref. 3:p. 48]. This is highly desirable for the computer
industry in our economic system Lh promotes and defends
full and open competitic, in accordance with the CICA.
"Protests are beciming part of vendors' strategies, rather
than just a way to remedy wrongdoing," says Eben Townes,
director of acquisition management services for International
Data Corp in Vienna, Va. The reader may find it hard to
believe that market trends for protests are reflective of
vendor strategies; however, Federal Systems Group Inc.,
Vienna, Va., a data communications equipment maker and
frequent protester, takes this approach. The company came
before the Board no less than three times in the first quarter
of 1989. "It doesn't cost us much to take the Government to
task," says Stephen Mills, Federal Systems' vice president of
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systems integration. "If there's a way we can win, we'll
protest." [Ref. 3:p. 48]
Why is this practice of protest becoming part of the
strategy for companies? Another view, by Mr. Robert
Finkelman, Director of the Computer Department at NAVAIRDEVCEN
in Warminster, Pa., states: "In the past there was a lot of
money for ADP acquisition. Today, the money is scarce and
competitors are aggressively vying for a bigger piece of a
shrinking pie." Mr. Finkelman goes on to say, "The
procurement system worked well before the end of the 1980's.
The reason people did not protest more often then was because
all competitors felt that they were getting their fair share
until defense spending was severely curbed. The NPS
procurement was only one of thirty seven procurement cases in
an eighteen month period. Only one of thirty seven was not
awarded after being protested." [Ref. 51 In FY 1989, there
were 37 protests filed with the GSBCA against the DoN.
Altogether during this timeframe, 39 GSBCA decisions were
handed down, including a fraction of the 37 filed. [Ref. 6:p.
32] In FY 1990, there were 50 protests filed with the GSBCA
against the DoN of which 37 GSBCA decisions resulted. [Ref.
7:p. 24]. One can see that protests are indeed on the
upswing.
In a number of cases the GSBCA has had to make judgmental
decisions about contracts that had little to do with the
detailed procedures they typically consider. These cases have
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included such issues as an agency's overall methods for
awarding contracts and its justifications for avoiding full
and open competition. In many of the cases, the Board has
accepted the agency's position. As a matter of fact, since
1985, protesters have achieved some of their objectives in
only 37 percent of all cases brought before the Board, while
31 percent of all ADPE protests have been dismissed or denied.
Only 21 percent of all protesters have recovered some or all
of the protests costs and/or pre-bid costs. (Ref. 3:p. 50]
There is rising federal concern that vendors are filing
protests merely to delay a procurement or to obtain a
competitive advantage. For example, in 1989 the Board
concluded that VION Corp., upon contesting provisions in an
U.S. Army solicitation shortly before offers were due, and by
then behaving uncooperatively during the pre-trial discovery
process, was more interested in securing "a tactical advantage
over the Army" through confusion and delay than in pursuing a
just cause. VION Corp.'s rationale for noncompliance was that
they felt the likely awardee's contract contained hidden
deficiencies that only the vendor community, but not the
Government, were able to see. By maintaining silence or
contempt, VION Corp. was attempting to influence
administrators of the contract to think twice about selecting
the most probable awardee. The Army filed legal action which
compelled VION Corp. to disclose any relevant information
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being withheld. This matter was presented to the GSBCA and
the Board dismissed the case. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
In the NPS mainframe protest, IBM spokesman Mark Holcomb
was cited in the May 1, 1989 issue of Government Computer News
as saying: "To our knowledge the specifications in the RFP
reflect the Navy's true needs and do not preclude the
protester or other vendors from bidding. We think the protest
is part of a marketing strategy that blatantly attempts to
intimidate the Navy to remove certain innovations from the
technical specifications that would make it more favorable for
their product lines." Holcomb was eluding to the idea that
when IBM competitors find that they cannot provide a
requesting agency with state-of-the-art products, they will
protest in an effort to be allowed to offer old technology.
Federal regulations allow a 12 to 18 month grace period to IBM
competitors allowing them time to copy IBM developments and to
begin their own production. In the May 4, 1989 issue of the
Washington Post, when asked to comment about the protest
Holcomb was again cited to say that "This protest had another
purpose." The company stated that the only advantage that it
(IBM) had came from its willingness to develop technology to
meet increasingly sophisticated needs.
A representative for a major ADPE firm stated during a
telephone conversation that competitors in the mainframe
business will protest the solicitation process or an award
when they feel there is a "good chance of winning". "Winning"
21
may be equated to the actual awarding of the contract or the
right to have legal court costs paid by the vendor or agency
playing the role of defendant. The losing vendor has nothing
further to risk by protesting. In fact, he stands a better
chance to come out ahead.
C. PROTEST-FREE PROCUREMNT
The most often heard complaint from vendors is that the
Government does not do a good enough job spelling out its
needs. Most consultants, attorneys, and GSA itself agree that
the answer to minimizing protests lies in better agency-vendor
communication through all phases of procurement. And when
protestable situations do arise, agencies should try to
resolve more of them before they reach the Board. [Ref. 3:p.
50]
In a recent FIRMR Bulletin, GSA recommended that agencies
establish independent review boards of their own to handle
vendor complaints and to avoid formal protests [Ref. 8:p.
26].
One key recommendation for minimizing protests in ADPE
procurement is to centralize the management of protest cases.
The Air Force and the Army have taken the first step in this
direction of streamlining responsibility for protest cases by
assigning responsibility for them to one competition advocate,
a specialist in GSBCA procurement cases. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
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Carl Peckinpaugh, attorney with the Secretary of the Air
Force (SecAF), Office of General Counsel (Procurement),
handles about 30 protests a year. Says Peckinpaugh:
"Centralized management of these cases helps put the agency on
the same footing as the protesters' private attorney."
Peckinpaugh also serves as ombudsman to the vendor community,
fielding questions and resolving as many protests as possible
before they reach the Board. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
Consolidation of responsibility for ADP procurements in a
central buying activity is the best way to improve the quality
of contracting and to avoid and win protests [Ref. 8:p. 26].
Centralization allows for the development of genuine,
substantive expertise by contracting personnel. This
expertise allows for not only avoiding protests, but also for
good, sound contracting [Ref. 8:p. 28].
In addition to centralized protest management, agencies
can take several additional steps to minimize the likelihood
of protests. The following are from the references cited:
9 Develop and write representative benchmarks which reflect
the workload and are characteristic of the throughput of
the system required. Agencies desiring the procurement of
ADPE must understand that benchmark development is a long
process which requires a great deal of research effort.
Agencies should request from GSA to have FEDSIM evaluate
benchmark specifications and benchmark test beds.
* Provide more detail in RFPs and adequately describe what
you need. The more offerors know, the less likely they
are to protest at a later date. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
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" Put yourself in the vendor's shoes in order to make the
procurement specifications as clear as possible [Ref.
3:p. 50]. Writing the Government's specifications
clearly, and in truly functional terms rather than
dictating a design, will help to minimize any restriction
on competition and allow as many vendors as possible to
compete [Ref. 8:p. 25].
* Tell offerors what you want them to achieve, then let them
design solutions and specify equipment. Do not be overly
restrictive by specifying brand-name equipment, which is
sure to spark protest. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
" Make sure that the vendor's evaluation of what an agency
needs matches the solicitation with respect to such
factors as cost, technology, and management [Ref. 3:p.
50).
" Add quality-control experts to your technical acquisition
team. People who understand the complexities of the
procurement system are as vital as the technicians
preparing the procurement specifications [Ref. 3:p. 50].
Be sure the technical evaluators are intimately familiar
with the requirements expressed in the RFP. It is
absolutely critical that agencies have a team of experts
who are familiar with the technical, contracting, and
legal aspects of each type of acquisition [Ref. 8:p. 27].
" Everyone who works on a procurement, including those at
the highest levels, must take the time to become
completely familiar with the relevant documents, and to
act as part of a team. Although the protest forums will
accord considerable deference to anyone who is qualified
and acting reasonably, they will not hesitate to chastise
even high officials who do not do their job. [Ref. 8:p.
27)
The following is a quote from Mr. Michael Jones, Manager
of Navy Accounts at the VION Corporation:
"Plan to negate strength of GSBCA appeals by vendors to
which the federal Government has a tendency to lose by
documenting requirements that should be met to the
fullest." (Ref. 2]
Many agencies may be reluctant to alter a functioning
procurement system to accommodate these recommendations.
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However, though the pressure on agencies to sharpen their
procurement skills may be coming from outside the Government,
it is the Government that stands to benefit the most. A clear
and thorough solicitation ultimately results in better
computer-related acquisitions. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter, it was pointed out that the requesting
agency must develop representative benchmarks and cite only
functional requirements substantiated with corroborative
documentation. To be effective, agency personnel must allow
sufficient time for benchmark research and design. ADPE
acquisitions must be planned with a well balanced and
organized team of technicians, lawyers, and contractors. All
requesting agencies must study the procurement regulations and
call for assistance from more senior service activities, GSA
or other federal agencies who are equipped and willing to
help. In the following chapter a case study of the NPS




Chapter III provided background for ADP protests. In this
chapter, the NPS mainframe procurement is presented as a case
study in a manner which attempts to represent all aspects of




The W.R. Church Computer Center at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) offers a wide range of services to
support the computational and information processing needs of
the educational, research, and administrative programs at the
school and the tenant activities.
Most of the services provided by the Center are
provided by an IBM 3033/4381 network which supports both high-
volume batch processing and general-purpose timesharing at
remote terminals.
Since 1975 the Center has provided substantial data
processing support to a tenant activity, the Defense Manpower
Data Center (DMDC) . In addition, small amounts of computer
time are occasionally provided on a non-interference basis to
other Government agencies.
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The IBM 3033 Attached Processor (AP) system was
installed in December 1980. With the procurement of this
system, a major shift in emphasis from card processing to
terminal-oriented computing was accomplished. In 1983 an IBM
3033 Model S was installed loosely-coupled to the IBM 3033 AP.
In July 1985, plans to acquire a new mainframe were
formulated as part of the 1988 Program Objectives Memorandum
(POM). The NPS POM was submitted to the Field Support
Activity and school's Major Claimant, OP-09BF, for review and
inclusion in the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO) POM to the
Secretary of the Navy (SecNav). Allocation of funds was
approved in the fiscal year (FY) 1988 defense budget. After
approval, these investment-type appropriations, categorized as
Other Procurement Navy (OPN), had an obligation duration of
three years. This meant these appropriated funds had to be
obligated i.e., a contract awarded, by the end of FY 1990--30
September, 1990. The reader shall see the significance of
this three year obligation time frame as the case discussion
continues.
In December 1985, the IBM 3033 Model S (8 MBytes)
processor was upgraded to a 3033 Model U (16 MBytes), and an
IBM 4381-Ml was added to the system to create a three-
processor network. These two units are the global and local
systems respectively of MVS/SP Release 1.4 with JES3
Networking operating system supporting the following types of
work:
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" Batch processing of larger jobs (CPU time, size,
input/output, etc)
" Multi-tape jobs (DMDC/DEERS data, scientific data
collection)
" Customer Information Control System (CICS) transaction
processing on the DEERS database and NPS Library's
bibliographic retrieval system
" All production printing (generated on VM and MVS),
publication quality
The 3033AP system provided interactive service by
running VM/SP Release 5 with CMS operating system supporting
the following types of work:
* 1600 CMS users per month, of whom 200 are simultaneously
active during p-ak periods
* executive 0- Iven, batch-like runs of large jobs overnight
and on -e .ends
* admn3irstrative database applications under FOCUS (academic
record-keeping, financial data)
The IBM 4381 was upgraded to Model P13 in June 1987;
at the same time the IBM 3850 mass storage cartridge system
was replaced by IBM 3380 disk storage and IBM 3480 tape
cartridge units, both systems being controlled by the
Hierarchical Storage Management (HSM) software facility. The
IBM 4381 was upgraded from a Model P13 (16 MBytes) to Model
Q13 (24 MBytes) in July, 1988. An IBM 3088 Multi-System
Channel Communication Unit (MCCU) connects the 3033AP, 3033U,
and 4381 Q13. Appendix B, Figure 1, shows the IBM 3033/4381
computer network before the 1990 procurement.
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2. Procurement
In the Summer of 1987, a Mainframe Replacement
Committee was formed and the NPS launched a study to plan a
modernization and upgrading project required to support
academic computing throughout the 1990's. The most critical
aspect of the project was the replacement of the IBM 3033AP
and 3033U processors presently installed in the school's
Computer Center. It was estimated that by the time the
procurement was effected, (it was initially estimated that
both the 3033AP and the 3033U processors would be replaced by
September 1989), the two aging IBM 3033 systems would have
been installed in the Center for nine years and would be
fourteen years old technologically. In addition to being
obsolete, the 3033s were underpowered and overloaded, in that
they were inadequate for handling the volume and throughput
performance requirements of the school's workload.
Historically NPS procured major ADPE on the average of
every eight to ten years. Therefore, in the 1990 procurement,
it was an objective of NPS to obtain ADPE which would allow
for growth to meet user requirements and have the potential to
be upgraded substantially in later years.
The upgrading plan had four major components, namely:
(1) Replacement of processor nucleus of the IBM network
retiring the IBM 3033 processors;
(2) Replacement of student public terminals;
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(3) Connection of existing computers and LANs via a campus
backbone network;
(4) Addition of a special purpose super-minicomputer on the
network dedicated to numerically intensive computing.
The general objectives of this project were to:
* upgrade the centrally-managed, service computing systems,
" interconnect the existing departmental computers and LANs,
and the centralized facilities in a campus-wide backbone
network, and
" provide improved, high-performance gateways to off-campus
systems.
This thesis will address only the procurement of
component (1) of the project, replacement of the IBM 3033
processors. This proposed procurement would replace only the
IBM 3033 processors in the Center's IBM network. The
auxiliary storage, communications processors, and other
peripheral devices were to remain. Studies were done using
the Conversion Cost Model developed by FEDSIM to estimate the
lifecycle cost of the procurement. After an extensive
iterative study, the school was able to determine that the
lifecycle cost to procure a non-IBM plug-compatible mainframe
would be approximately $160 million. This figure is based on
software and hardware conversion costs plus facility
remodeling and reconfiguration cost estimates. Due to the
fact that only the processors would be replaced, a major
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decision was made by the school to seek IBM plug-
compatibility.
The Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) was
approved by the Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command
(NMPC), OP-16, in May 1986. NMnC is the functional sponsor of
the NPS, the Naval Academy, and the Naval War College. It was
for this reason that NMPC approved the school's MENS. In
November 1987, NPS drafted and submitted an Analysis of
Alternatives and Abbreviated Systems Decision Paper (ASDP) via
the ADP approval echelon for review and approval. The ADP
approval echelon is as follows: 1) NPS; 2) OP-09BF, Field
Support Activity and school's Major Claimant; 3) NMPC (OP-16) ;
and finally, 4) NAVDAC (Naval Data Automation Command--now
Naval Computers and Telecommunications Command (NCTC)). By
January 1988 the ASDP (rated at $21 million) was approved and
NPS received the approval to continue with the procurement
process. Because the estimated purchase price was greater
than $2.5 million, NPS was required to obtain a specific
Delegation of Procurement Authority (DPA) from the GSA in
accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 270.303-
2. The DPA was received on 18 March 1988 from the GSA under
case number KMA-88-0202 and it provided the Naval Regional
Contracting Center (NRCC) Detachment Long Beach (henceforth
noted as NRCC) with the authority to perform the procurement.
As stated previously, this thesis will only review the facts
surrounding the replacement or the processor nucleus of the
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IBM network. The lifecycle cost for processor replacement was
estimated to be in the vicinity of $10 million. The
procurement threshold limits of NRCC was $10 million; however,
there was speculation that the processor procurement would
exceed this amount. The school was concerned that such a
situation would occur and therefore contacted the Navy's
Automatic Data Processing Selection Office (ADPSO). ADPSO
however, would not accept the NPS mainframe procurement
because it was too minor of an acquisition. ADPSO is
accustomed to handling hardware procurements which range from
$50-100 million. Therefore the procurement remained with
NRCC. Appendix C, Figure 1, displays the planned
configuration of the NPS mainframe suite after procurement was
expected to be completed in September 1989.
On 4 August 1988, NPS delivered draft copies of the
RFP Sections C, L, and M for review by NRCC. Inputs by the
school included items such as software and hardware
requirements, manuals and documentation, contractor support,
maintenance of equipment, software maintenance, and benchmark
test results.
On 15 March 1989, one month after the House
Subcommittee commenced its investigation, Solicitation Number
N00123-88-R-1013 was issued by NRCC for the NPS mainframe
procurement. This was in the midst of allegations of IBM
preference by the "Gang of Six". Proposals from industry were
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to be submitted within one month, no later than 14 April 1989.
In early April 1989, the Department of the Navy ADP
Acquisition Assessment Panel (DoN ADP AAP) was established to
review Navy and Marine Corps computer acquisitions and charges
of bias as a result of the "Gang of Six" allegations. This
"blue ribbon" panel was co-chaired by the Navy's Competition
Advocate General, RADM William H. Hauenstein, and the Director
of the Navy's Information Resources Management, RADM Paul E.
Tobin. The Navy panel was established to give SecNav a "feel"
for the magnitude of any problems uncovered and to recommend
solutions to these problems. With regard to the "Gang of Six"
and other protests, the panel met 19 times and reviewed 40
different topics. It met with the six vendors three times and
three times with IBM. When the panel was established, it had
no idea that on the horizon loomed another protest by
PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. against the Navy, this time against
the NPS mainframe procurement. During this period prior to
the protest two RFP amendments were issued. Amendment One was
issued for the purpose of inserting an extraneous ccntracting
clause and also to correct typographical errors. On 7 April
1989, NRCC contracting officials sent out a mailgram notifying
vendors that it would issue Amendment 2 in response to
vendors' questions regarding the school's RFP. The RFP
closing date was extended to 28 April 1989.
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3. Protest
On 11 April 1989, PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. protested
the NPS solicitation to the GSBCA stating that 1) the NPS
procurement contained extremely restrictive requirements that
IBM competitors could not meet, 2) it was an IBM sole source
procurement disguised as a competitive acquisition, and 3) the
NPS has displayed a pattern of bias in its acquisition of IBM
products [Ref. 12:p. 1]. The protest centered on Section C
(Description/Specification/Work Statement) of the RFP.
Appendix E contains the PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. letter of
protest to the GSBCA. Appendix F provides a summary of
protest issues and action taken by NPS. These allegations
were added to those already being considered by legislators on
Capitol Hill and the DoN ADP AAP which was investigating the
purported IBM-preference charges by the "Gang of Six". The
NPS procurement thus took on a political twist.
On 14 April 1989, the GSBCA suspended the school's
solicitation and assigned the case protest number KMA-88-0202.
The GSBCA hearing was tentatively scheduled for 16 May 1989.
On 30 April 1989, an internal memo from the Navy
legal counsel at NRCC assigned the case to a Navy legal
colleague in Washington, DC, was inadvertently faxed to
attornies at PacifiCorp Capital's law firm. The contents of
the fax were leaked to the press. It backed the protester's
claim of IBM bias in the solicitation. The document said in
part, "I've put on my judge's hat of two years ago and believe
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that we would lose on the bias charge. The evidence of
closeness between the school and IBM keeps growing." The
counsel characterized the procurement as showing "bias or at
least the lack of a functioning brain." [Ref. ll:p. 18]
4. Politically Sensitive Issues
The NPS procurement may have been significantly
influenced by a number of politically sensitive issues that
resulted in considerable adverse publicity for the DoN. The
following is a synopsis of those critical and impacting
events.
On 4 October 1988, PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. filed a
protest with the GSBCA regarding the Navy's $150 million
solicitation in the third phase of the Data Processing
Installation Equipment Transition (DPI-ET Phase III). The
DPI-ET Phase III was intended to install IBM-compatible
mainframe computers in the nine Navy Regional Data Automation
Centers (NARDACs) and in five Navy Regional Data Automation
Facilities (NARDAFs).
On 17 November 1988, a letter was delivered to
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Carlucci from a group of six
vendors: Amdahl Corp., NCR Comten, Storage Technology Corp.,
Memorex Telex Federal Systems, PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., and
the VION Corp. The group of six vendors, who later would be
called the "Gang of Six", complained to SecDef that the Navy
had unfairly favored IBM products and were not adhering to the
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law in accordance with the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984. (It should be pointed out that the CICA was
passed in order to ensure full and open competition in
federally funded procurements by providing a "level playing
field" on which all competing contractors would have an equal
opportunity, through arms-length dealings, to sell to the
federal Government.)
The letter contended that the Navy routinely designed
or "wired" specifications around IBM corporate and product
features to preclude any real competition to IBM.
Furthermore, it accused Navy officials of "manipulating the
procurement process" to IBM's advantage. It cited instances
of using such tactics as multiple best and final offers
(BAFOs) that extend the bidding until IBM's bid is considered
low enough to win the contract. Multiple BAFOs exist when
discussions regarding a contract award are reopened under the
guise that it is in the best interest of the Government. The
DoD FAR 15.611 (Best and Final Offers) subsection (c) states
that discussions shall not be reopened and if a situation
requiring further discussions occurs, the contracting officer
shall issue an additional request for best and final offers to
all offerors still in the competitive range. The calling for
multiple BAFOs is neither ethical nor legal. Calling for
multiple BAFOs can easily be construed by vendors to be
preferenced "auction" work.
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In addition to complaining about the Navy's
procurement practices, the letter also identified six
previously awarded Navy procurements alleged to have shown
preference towards IBM. The "Gang of Six" requested that Mr.
Carlucci personally order an investigation into the Navy's
procurement practices [Ref. 9: p. 1].
On 8 December 1988, the GSBCA ruled in favor of
PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., (representing the "Gang of Six" in
GSBCA case no. 9732-P) sustaining their protest and stated
that the Navy had unfairly favored IBM in the previously cited
1987, 10-year, $150 million solicitation for replacement of
the mainframe computers under DPI-ET Phase IIT [Ref. 10:p.
9751. The GSBCA concluded that the solicitation provided for
less than full and open competition, and that the Navy had
failed to adequately justify restrictions on competition. As
a result of the ruling by the GSBCA, GSA canceled the DPA for
the procurement. The Navy had previously argued that
performing a sole source procurement would result in lower
prices, eliminate compatibility problems, minimize hardware
replacement, and would cost less administratively [Ref. ll:p.
631. The Navy eventually canceled the solicitation for DPI-ET
Phase III.
In February 1989, the House of Representatives'
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security initiated an
investigation into allegations of improper behavior and IBM
bias after vendor's complaints of unfair procurement practices
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within the Navy's multi-billion dollar ADP market. Since that
time, the investigation has been expanded to cover other
agencies including the National Institute of Health, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Treasury
Department; all large buyers of ADPE. (Ref. ll:p. 2]
On 19 April 1989, an explosion inside the 16-inch gun
turret on the battleship U.S.S. Iowa (BB-61) killed 47 sailors
and few weeks later, on 9 May, a fire caused by a fuel leak in
the engine room of the Navy combat supply ship U.S.S. White
Plains (AFS-4), claimed the lives of six sailors. These Navy
mishaps drew the immediate attention of the media.
On 14 May 1989, an explosion and fire aboard the
aircraft carrier U.S.S. America (CV-66) killed two crew
members after a fuel pump exploded while the ship was
operating in the Atlantic Ocean. Again the Navy received
enormous negative publicity from the media.
During April 1989, the Navy Inspector General reopened
the investigation of the Computer Science Department incident
regarding mishandling of workshop funds donated by IBM. The
initial investigation by the IG took place in 1986 and was
unknown to anyone in the Computer Center to have occurred.
The original investigation of the matter found no evidence of
criminal misconduct, but discovered that regulations
prohibiting gratuity had been violated. The second review by
the IG was a direct result of the PacifiCorp Capital protest
letter sent to th- CSBCA. The letter stated that the Computer
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Science Department incident showed evidence that the NPS and
IBM had a very close relationship which suggested reasons for
IBM bias in the school's mainframe procurement. The final IG
report stated that there was no evidence that the incident had
any bearing on the procurement.
In July 1989, the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) responded to GAO reports of mismanagement of ADP
resources in DoD by suggesting that no further funding would
be forthcoming until a strategy was devised to correct
deficiencies.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the U.S. in
concert with its allies responded by sending troops and arms
in an effort to avert further aggression by Iraq. In order to
fund this operation then known as "Desert Shield", the DoD
froze all unobligated funds and designated them for use in
supporting theater operations. Among the assets frozen by the
DoD were funds to be used by NPS in the acquisition of the
mainframe.
5. Settlement
After discussions with the Office of SecNav, the
members of the DoN ADP AAP, and Navy legal counsels, the
chairmen of the DoN ADP AAP ietermined that winning the NPS
case before the GSBCA would be a difficult task. The panel,
considering the risks and benefits, determined that it would
be better to settle out-of-court and pay the legal fees
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($45,000) to the plaintiff rather than to attempt to take the
case into GSBCA court, risk the possibility of losing and
possibly having to pay legal costs, which were estimated to go
as high as $500,000. Sources at GSA have stated that legal
costs include attorney fees, protest preparation costs, and
proposal preparation costs [Ref. 16]. The protestor normally
accounts for all associated costs down to the penny and then
requests the GSBCA judge to rule on the costs award [Ref.
16]. It is not uncommon for the GSA to witness protest
settlements which exceed $1 million [Ref. 16].
On 11 May 1989, the Navy and PacifiCorp Capital, Inc.
reached an out of court settlement and the protest was
dismissed without prejudice. The following were the principle
terms of the settlement:
" The solicitation is to be canceled within five days [Ref.
13:p. 18].
" The follow-on procurement is to be conducted under the
auspices of the DoN ADP AAP [Ref. 13:p. 18].
" The follow-on solicitation is to be conducted in
accordance with the terms of the motion to dismiss the
protest [Ref. 13 :p. 18].
" The follow-on procurement is to be conducted as a single
acquisition to include hardware, software, and services
[Ref. 13:p. 18].
" The follow-on procurement is to be processed by the
Automatic Data Processing Selection Office (ADPSO) instead
of NRCC, Long Beach [Ref. 13:p. 18]. ADPSO buys all high
value (above $10 million) general-purpose nontactical
commercial ADP resources, and develops policy and approval
requirements for awarding and administering contracts
[Ref. ll:p. 10].
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* The follow-on Navy analysis of the NPS requirement is to
be made publicly available for review and comment and is
to be announced in the Commerce Business Daily [Ref.
13:p. 18].
• The Navy's ADP AAP, or DONIRM, is to consider any comments
received regarding the requirements analysis. Any vendor
is to have the right to request the panel to change the
follow-on solicitation or take any other action required
by the motion to dismiss the protest. [Ref. 13 :p. 181
" The Navy is to state its requirements to permit at least
all manufacturers and their authorized dealers of IBM or
IBM plug-compatible hardware and software to compete for
the award. [Ref. 13:p. 18]
" The Navy is to measure an offeror's compliance with the
specifications through the use of a benchmark test. [Ref.
13:p. 18]
" Subject to stated exceptions, the follow-on procurement is
not to require support for, or installation of, any
engineering changes for hardware, software, or feature not
supported by all plug-compatible manufacturers at the time
the solicitation is issued. [Ref. 13:p. 18]
On 12 May 1989, NRCC canceled the solicitation in
accordance with procurement regulations.
On 8 September 1989, as a result of the settlement of
the PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. protest, the DoN ADP AAP began to
review the NPS mainframe procurement to determine what
problems, if any, existec in the original RFP and to consider
the school's proposed changes to clarify or remove some of the
system requirements.
6. Procurement Reinitiation
In November 1989, in accordance with the settlement,
a new contracting office was assigned and ADPSO, Washington,
DC., initiated procurement actions to acquire the mainframe
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for NPS. ADPSO was assigned procurement activities due to the
out-of-court settlement. ADPSO was also better prepared to
provide NPS greater technical expertise than NRCC.
Between the months of November 1989 and March 1990,
the school was working feverishly revisiting and rewriting the
life cycle management studies. This included the rewriting of
documents such as the requirements analysis, software
conversion study, analysis of alternatives, and benchmark.
In March 1990, the NPS procurement project was
received at ADPSO.
On 6 April 1990, ADPSO released the school's draft
RFP, Requirements Analysis (RA), and proposed benchmark for
industry comments and suggestions in accordance with the
settlement agreement. Comments were received by 9 May 1990,
written responses were distributed by ADPSO. As a result of
inputs received from industry, the school dropped the MIPS and
MFLOPS requirement and decided to depend solely on the
benchmark results to establish performance levels of the
mainframe. On 13 July 1990 the final RFP was released for
competitive bidding. This RFP, as had the previous one, had
a clause in Section M ((Evaluation Factors for Award) that
stipulated to the vendors that the Government reserved the
right to make the contract award without discussion or
deliberation. Offers from industry sources were due to the
procurement office by 13 August 1990.
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7. Award
Prior to 2 August, NPS and ADPSO were working hard to
make the source selection and award of the mainframe contract
before 30 September, the end of FY 1990. Recall that funds
for the mainframe were appropriated as a result of the FY 1988
POM and that they had to be obligated within three years i.e.,
not later than 30 September 1990. After suffering the harsh
reality of a protest, the exhausting ordeal of regenerating
all of the required documents, and a year's delay in the
procurement, NPS now faced a lack of funding. This setback
required many telephone calls and letters from the
Superintendent and Comptroller in an effort to get reserve
funds released for the acquisition. On 13 August 1990, NPS
and ADPSO began to evaluate proposals in terms of costs and
technical acceptability. On 24 August 1990, NPS and ADPSO
determined the ranking of Offers. The likely winners (the one
with the least-cost technically acceptable proposal) performed
the pre-award benchmark test on 10 and 11 September 1990. The
contract award was made on 21 September 1990 to PacifiCorp
Capital, Inc. who had bid Amdahl computers.
The follow-on procurement had proven to be one of the
most rapid acquisition processes ever handled by ADPSO. It
took 6 months from procurement request to contract award.
Appendix D desribes the typical Navy ADP acquisition process.
A funded delivery order was issued on 21 September 1990 and
the delivery of the initial system was set for December 1990.
43
Appendix A, Section A, summarizes key events of the NPS
mainframe procurement. Appendix A, Section B, summarizes the
significant and politically sensitive events and issues which
resulted in adverse publicity for the Navy. Appendix C,
Figure 1, displays the IBM-compatible network configuration
after the installation of the Amdahl 5990-500 computer.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter described the controversial turn of events
surrounding the NPS mainframe procurement. As noted, there
were a great number of distractions which occurred between the
time of protest and final procurement which possibly could
have influenced decisions of top-level Navy management with
regard to handling the issues surrounding this case. The next
chapter contains the case analysis and is intended to




The case study presented in chapter f , ,r covered the
details of the NPS mainframe procurement. In this chapter,
the procurement and protest are analyzed. The personal view
of the author is presented in a manner which is intended to
stimulate the analytical thinking of the reader and to
facilitate the development of future teaching notes.
B. CASE ANALYSIS
The protest of the NPS mainframe computer procurement was
not such an extraordinary case that it deserved the publicity
that it received. Early in 1989, significant press attention
was focused on allegations that Federal agencies were
improperly and unfairly structuring major computer
procurements to favor the products and services offered by the
IBM Corporation [Ref. 4:p. 6]. The heightened interest was
keyed by the "Gang of Six" in their 17 November 1988 letter to
Secretary of Defense Carlucci. While not part of the "Gang of
Six" complaint, NPS was not the only agency to be drawn into
the IBM bias quagmire. The NPS procurement was "special"
because it was the first Navy IBM plug-compatible procurement
to occur after the publicized IBM bias letter was sent to
Secretary of Defense. There is significant evidence to
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suggest that the NPS acquisition was used by the verdors as
another example of alleged IBM bias. For example, Sid Wilson,
vice-presider.t of PacifiCorp Capital Inc. Systems Integration
Division said the protest is part of his company's efforts to
educate the Navy about procurement abuses and resolve the
problem. In the 4 May 1989 issue of the Washington Post,
Wilson was cited to say that "We're pleased. It's significant
because it's recognition that bias does exist and that
certainly this particular procurement needs to be cleaned up
to comply with the requirements of full and open competition."
Recall that it was PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. who represented
the "Gang of Six" in their GSBCA protest against IBM.
There were other DoD agencies involved in IBM plug-
compatible procurements awarded in recent years that also came
under fire in 1989 for alleged IBM preference. The Naval
Construction Battalion in Port Hueneme, Ca, the Enlisted
Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) in New Orleans, La, the
Navy Accounting and Finance Center (NAFC) in Cleveland, Ca,
the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) in Washington DC,
and the Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) in Washington
DC are all examples. NAFC, NMPC, and NAVDAC were cited by the
"Gang of Six" in their November 1988 letter to SecDef Carlucci
as having alleged bias for IBM. Ironically, the dollar value
of the NPS procurement was significantly less than the dollar
values of the other procurements cited in the "Gang of Six"
letter to Secretary of Defense.
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In the NPS RFP, IBM prejudice was asserted by the
protestor in several areas as delineated in Appendix F.
PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. also alleged that an unethical
relationship existed between IBM and certain faculty members
of the Computer Science Department at NPS in which funds were
solicited from IBM in 1986 to support the school's activities.
The funds were used to defray the administrative costs
associated with a professional workshop and official
conference of NPS. One of the individuals involved had been
an IBM employee for more than 20 years and had a consulting
contract with IBM some years before. Typical expenditures
from the fund were for departmental expenses related to
seminar speakers, support for planning subsequent meetings,
and printing of publications. Between 1986 and 1988, someone
placed a hotline call to report fraud, waste, and abuse with
regard to the handling of the funds. This was highly
publicized in the press. In 1988, the Navy's Inspector
General (IG) came to NPS and investigated the matter
concerning the workshop funds. The IG found that the fund was
not being maintained in strict accordance with Executive Order
11222 and several instructions promulgated by the Secretary of
the Navy were found to have been violated. However, the IG
found no evidence of criminal activity. This was not reported
by the press.
As a result of protest allegations by PacifiCorp Capital,
Inc. stating that NPS had displayed bias towards IBM by virtue
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of maintaining the workshop funds, the IG conducted a second
independent investigation to see if there was any relationship
between NPS and IBM that could have influenced the mainframe
procurement in any way. The IG report of 1989 concluded that
the actions of the personnel involved in the workshop fund had
absolutely no bearing on the NPS procurement. The foregoing
is an example of the political grandstanding used by a
protester to bring into play irrelevant events which
eventually were used to further cloud the prevailing
atmosphere in the mainframe procurement.
In reality, the program manager (PM) and the procurement
technical team had no idea that solicitation of funds from IBM
had taken place and furthermore, had no idea that the Navy IG
was called in to investigate the workshop fund matter prior to
initiating the mainframe computer procurement. For the PM and
the procurement technical team, the whole situation was a case
of bad publicity.
Publicity associated with this protest continued. The
handling of the incorrectly faxed memo by the Navy lawyer
handling the case was unethical, if not illegal. The message
was privileged communication, lawyer to lawyer. As such it
should not have been presented to the protestor PacifiCorp
Capital, Inc., who in turn made it public by giving it to the
press. It was an example of an honest mistake on the part of
the Navy legal counsel made into a public affair. It is
obvious that this matter could have been handled
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professionally and in a different way. The bottom line is
that the error provided the protester more political leverage
in the case.
One problem faced by the NPS was that it could not cost-
effectively measure its future requirements. One of the most
effective ways to predict future throughput and to estimate
requirements is to develop and use a benchmark tailored to the
needs of the institution. A benchmark consists of running a
known portion of the workload which is representative of the
entire workload on the proposed equipment. The data package
includes a mix of benchmark programs, data and output results.
The ber,-hmark must be repeatable and should be independent of
the system on which it is run. It is provided to those
vendors who specifically request the benchmark package and it
assists in judging the scale and complexity of equipment and
software necessary to process the user's workload.
Benchmark development is a long and costly process which
may contain subjective and controversial specifications.
Correct benchmark establishment is not simply an extrapolation
of current levels into the future. Extrapolation or casual
estimation results in the delineation of non-functional,
unsubstantiated specification requirements. As stated
previously, NPS had a difficulty in developing a benchmark
which would represent the future workload of the users.
The specification requirements, as initially drafted, were
not designed to give IBM an advantage, but to provide the NPS
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with the "best-value" procurement available. "Best-value" is
the term requesting agencies assign to the product which
contains added requirement factors which are of the greatest
value to the overall procurement. For example, vendor-
provided service and maintenance, company reputation and
longevity, vendor experience, customer support, and the
vendor's relationships with other companies which lead to
customer benefits are all critical "best-value" factors which
enhance the position of an ADPE vendor. Each of these
categories is assigned a weight and the final analysis of the
total weights aids in the decision-making process for
selecting the winning offer. However, in practice, the Navy
does not follow "best-value" strategies t , the extent where
maximum benefits for each tax dollar spent can be obtained.
This is due to the fact that "best-value" procurement
specifications contain a higher degree of subjectivity and are
prime targets for protests by commercial vendors. If the
"best-value" philosophy is adopted, it appears that there will
always be an unhappy vendor who is unable to compete
economically.
The major advantage of adopting the "best-value"
philosophy is that in the short run, the Navy gets state-of-
the-art equipment and in the long run is able to have updates
effected upon system hardware, software, and possibly
firmware. A major disadvantage to the "best-value" philosophy
is that it costs more to produce and deliver the best product
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available. Navy ADPE procurements, like most other federal
acquisitions, are too often based solely on price which
incorporates least common denominator requirements. Federal
procurement regulations, CICA, and GSBCA all provide
incentives for vendors to scream "foul" when they believe they
have been blocked from competition. In federal ADPE
procurements,the total tax dollars spent most frequently is
the bottom line. In private industrial procurements, the life
cycle opportunity best suiting the needs of the organization
is the one pursued by top-level management. These
institutions have a different philosophy from the federal
Government. They will not buy a product simply because it is
the cheapest model available and for which the needs and
requirements of the organization can be "manipulated" to meet
the performance standards of the "least cost" machine.
Private industry will procure the machine which best fits its
needs and organizational requirements.
Certain federal agencies responsible for the review of the
NPS procurement, afte... the protest to the GSBCA, concluded
that NPS and the PM were the main reasons why the protest
surfaced. They alleged the PM and the technical procurement
team were not following what was going on in the mainframe
computer industry. However, the author learned through
research and several interviews that the PM for the
procurement was very experienced with many aspects of
procuring a mainframe computer, having headed up the previous
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procurements in 1967 and 1980. He had 35 plus years
experience in the computer business. He was aware of the
inquiry and investigation ongoing in the federal Government
aimed at probing procurements for signs of IBM bias. This
included the high visibility investigations being conducted by
the Government Accounting Office (GAO), House Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security, the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), and the DoN ADP AAP.
The PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. protest may have been
politically motivated to some degree in that it offered an
opportunity for IBM competitors to bring the IBM-bias
allegation back onto the front pages of the press. It cannot
be proven that the NPS deliberately attempted to bias the
specifications in favor of IBM. However, according to the DoN
ADP AAP, there were requirement specifications cited in the
RFP which were not functional and were not substantiated with
adequate documentation. A representative from the DoN ADP AAP
stated that by specifying MIPS and MFLOPS, NPS failed to
provide industry with information regarding the true needs of
the agency and future computer throughput [Ref. 4]. He added
that the original requirements analysis was not well defined
and did not reflect the agency's needs [Ref. 4]. It was
further stated that the benchmark did not accurately correlate
with the requirements analysis (Ref. 4]. One industry source
believes that the development of a dialogue by PacifiCorp
Capital, Inc. and NPS could have easily dismissed any
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confusion with regard to the school's needs and problems with
the requirements analysis and benchmark may have been solved
without intervention from the GSBCA [Ref. 2].
It is believed that the managers at NPS were familiar with
the current trends in the federal ADPE procurement arena with
regard to restrictive specifications and protests and
attempted to avoid the pitfalls experienced by other federal
agencies. Several years prior to the NPS protest an agency
could write what could be construed as "preferenced
specifications" and a protest would likely not have developed.
Perhaps if the managers at NPS insisted that NRCC send the
draft RFP to industry for comment, the protest by PacifiCorp
Capital, Inc. may have been averted. Any specification which
the vendor did not agree with could have been reviewed and
changed if possible.
In the author's opinion politics were a factor in the NPS
case. At the time of the NPS protest, a great deal of
political pressure was been placed on the Navy to get matters
surrounding IBM plug-compatibles squared away. The DoN ADP
AAP was being pressured into accepting the position of the IBM
competitors since they had the attention of the Congres3. The
protestor's true agenda was to use the existing political
climate to their advantage. The protestor felt that any
specification which would provide the requesting agency the
best product and newest technology favored IBM as the leader
in the mainframe marketplace and put all other competitors at
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a disadvantage. The strategy of the protestor was to attempt
to get such specifications removed from the RFP. If a
protestor is successful in getting such specifications
removed, then they stand a better chance of the award due to
the fact that once technology is old, it is cheaper to buy.
Attention should also be directed to the background of the
IBM competitors. It is likely only three IBM plug-compatible
companies will remain in existence by the year 2000. They are
Fujitsu, Hitachi, and IBM. It is the author's belief that
protests, such as the one faced by NPS, are a strategy of the
industry to gain more of a share of the mainframe marketplace.
PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. is a systems integrator who bids
Amdahl products almost solely. Fujitsu owns approximately 48%
of the stock value in Amdahl. It appears as though the
Japanese companies are attempting to erode IBM's edge in the
mainframe business.
At the time of the NPS procurement, the Navy also had a
public affairs image that required restoration. Not only was
the "Gang of Six" issue close at hand, but, as mentioned in
this case, there were a series of unrelated Navy mishaps and
accidents which occurred in the April/May 1989 time frame.
There was the explosion in one of the 16-inch gun turrets
aboard the battleship Iowa, a fire in the engineroom of the
combat supply ship White Plains, and an explosion and fire
aboard the aircraft carrier America just to name a few of the
incidents. The last thing that the Navy wanted was additional
54
adverse publicity--i.e., the ongoing controversy surrounding
IBM plug-compatible mainframes. As a result, the Navy was
likely motivated to some degree, to settle the protest. This
required the school to change any specification requirement
which could be construed in the slightest way to give any one
competitor an advantage.
In earlier years, including the days of the NPS
procurement of the IBM 370, there was more money available for
ADPE procurements. Today, things have changed. Even though
information processing demands are much greater, there is even
less money provided for ADPE. As a result, vicious fights
have taken place politically, legally and financially amongst
the civilian vendors in the IBM plug-compatible arena to
attempt to level the playing field. It now appears that a
level playing field means that there can be no requirements
established by the requesting agency to obtain "best-value"
equipment and therefore the contract award will always go to
the lowest bidder.
A basic fact of the entire ADP procurement process is that
protests appear to have become a way of life for the
competitors in the industry. In past years, losing a
mainframe award was frequently not a big item of contention.
If an award was lost, industries automatically took for
granted that there would be other opportunities to counteract
the disappointment of not being awarded a specific contract.
However, with today's diminishing defense dollars and
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restrictive budgets, the protests have led to bitter
competition by IBM plug-compatible manufacturers who want to
maintain or increase their slice of a shrinking budget pie.
Companies often feel that if they can win a protest by
appealing to the GSBCA, they will do so. It is often apparent
to them that they can either win the case at the GSBCA or at
least have legal costs paid by the defendant agencies or
award-winning firms. Often times, computer industry firms
have to provide legal counsel to defend the rights of the
federal Government in a protest because of the fear of some
companies that the federal Government does not possess an
adequate amount of legal expertise to maintain and defend a
previously awarded contract.
Another cause of the intense competition in the mainframe
domain has been the proliferation of microcomputers. It has
been stated by VADM Jerry 0. Tuttle, Director of Space,
Command and Control (0P-094) in the Office of the CNO, that
the Navy is looking forward to placing more emphasis on the
use of microcomputers in the near future. VADM Tuttle
inferred the decreasing role of mainframe computers in his
keynote address at the Navy Micro 1990 conference in San Diego
in July of 1990. He said "Micros are where the action is in
the computer business." Pointing out that a Compaq Computer
Corp. file server based on the Intel 80486 chip has the same
processing power as an IBM 4381 that up to a few years ago ran
the entire active duty Navy payroll. [Ref. 14:p. 8]
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VADM Tuttle also pointed out that the industries recognize
the growing trend towards microcomputers and their
desirability. Therefore, there may be fewer mainframe
computer procurements in the years ahead. By showing the
published difference between the mainframe industry's leading
journal DATAMATION which has 128 numbered pages and PC
MAGAZINE which is a bi-weekly publication which had 458
numbered pages, VADM Tuttle was quick to ask the question "Is
there any doubt where this business is headed?"
The Navy is not the only federal agency to feel the need
to take advantage of current trends in the computer industry.
The Army is currently moving much of its computing from IBM
mainframes operating in the batch mode to a distributed
processing, open-systems environment with personal computers
carrying much of the load [Ref. 14:p. 9]. The Army plans to
cut sharply the number of applications running on about 134
million lines of code, 90 percent of which are run on IBM
mainframes. The Army's Sustaining Base Information System
(SBIS) has the key goal of developing applications that can
run on personal computers (Ref. 14:p. 9]. In view of these
bjectives, the mainframe suppliers continue to develop very
aggressive strategies that make assertive attempts at landing
contracts and awards in the mainframe arena.
Movement away from the mainframe environment is also
apparent in the Air Force and at NASA. Combined with the Navy
and Army, these four agencies comprise over 70 percent of the
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mainframe industry's market to the federal Government [Ref.
15:p. 102]. Due to the shrinking market, it can be understood
why the mainframe procurement protests are so critical and
also why a non-IBM loser would be inclined to appeal the
protest to the GSBCA.
The next ten years is a period many of the leading
mainframe firms feel will be critical for survival. A
reliable, unidentified industry source representing a major
systems integrator provided this bleak prognosis for the
competitors in the mainframe arena by stating that "Only three
of today's major companies will be viable in the year 2000.
These companies will be Hitachi, Fujitsu, and IBM--the leader
in the 370/390 architecture arena." One can now see why it is
so important for IBM competitors to wrestle as much of the
opportunity for Navy mainframe procurements away from the
Armonk, New York based firm over the next few years.
C. NPS MAINFRAME PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS-DIFFERENT VIEWS
Representatives from several federal agencies were asked
for their opinion as to what were some of the problems in the
NPS procurement. The various offices include the DoN ADP AAP,
FEDSIM, GSA, and NAVAIRDEVCEN. Each of the problem
perspectives are reflective of the particular agency
presenting them. These agencies also provided insight into
some of the more chronic problems facing the federal
Government with regard to ADPE acquisition.
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1. From the DoN ADP AAP perspective:
There is an urgent need to develop quality specifications
that reflect minimum functional requirements. Requiring
activities do not continuously procure ADP systems,
especially mid to large ADP systems. As a result,
personnel developing an organization's ADP requirements
package lack expertise needed to prepare quality
specifications.
" There is no vehicle for procuring activities and
contracting officers to have technical specifications
reviewed by Government specialists in an effort to
preclude releasing restrictive specifications.
" There is poor planning and unsatisfactory execution of
these plans by the federal agencies when attempting to
procure ADPE.
" Effective dialogue with industry had not been conducted.
* High-level DoN/Industry roundtable discussions with
regards to problems, perceptions, and potential
improvements do not exist.
2. From the FEDSIM perspective:
" Procurements in the federal Government change constantly
as do the strategies that guide these procurements due to
a number of factors like technology available, money
available, politics involved, etc.
" The NPS procurement requirement analysis stipulated
interactive and batch-processing workloads while the
benchmark consisted of scientific and engineering
computational tasks.
" NPS procurement arrived during a bad time. The "Gang of
Six" procurement was still fresh in the minds of people.
3. From the GSA perspective:
" Agencies like the NPS procure ADPE infrequently. It is
very difficult to perform a good procurement when an
agency only does it as infrequently as the NPS. The
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industry is constantly changing and capabilities are
always being advanced.
" Agencies must get involved in assisting in the planning of
their procurements. Help is needed in the planning phases
at the agency level.
" The federal Government needs to spend more money training
and assisting decentralized agencies like the NPS in the
major areas of ADPE acquisition.
4. From NAVAIRDEVCEN perspective:
* In the Navy, ADPE procurements are not well defined and
unde-stood. There is not enough emphasis on requirements
analysis in the beginning of the procurement process. The
requirements analysis submitted by the NPS was not well
defined and did not delineate what was required and sought
in the procurement. A key action on behalf of NPS was
that the requirements analysis was completely redone after
the protest to remove all signs of vendor preference and
to make the requirements analysis more defendable.
" Most people who do perform procurements, do it so
infrequently that they are inexperienced and unfamiliar.
" There was more money available in the past for ADPE
acquisition. In today's budget cutbacks, money is scarce
and everyone is trying to get his market share. This is
a reason that protests are much more prevalent these days.
* NPS had extremely bad timing with the "Gang of Six"
protest that had recently been brought to light.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter, an indepth analysis was made of the
overall NPS mainframe procurement. The views presented were
those of the author and the perspectives of individuals
representing agencies of the federal Government. Problems
believed to have exacerbated the protest were delineated. In
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As stated previously, protests in the procurement of major
ADPE are becoming more common everyday. Similar mainframe
procurement protests, coupled with the protest of the NPS
procurement, has provided a wealth of experience and a number
of lessons learned. These lessons were collected and a
synopsis was created from research performed and interviews
conducted with key Government and civilian sector officials.
Inputs received from ADPSO, DoN ADP AAP, DONIRM, GSA, NPS, and
NRCC have been presented in bullet format. They will prove to
be valuable to anyone involved in the IBM plug-compatible
mainframe acquisition business.
B. CASE LESSONS LEARNED
The following lessons learned are organized by Government
activity.
1. From the ADPSO perspective:
The NPS mainframe procurement was an ADPSO success story.
This procurement took a little over two and one-half
months from time of RFP release to award. ADPSO normally
takes nine months to one year from release of RFP to
award. By the same token, the time limitations were a
problem factor in and of themselves. There was not the
time available to create a comprehensive benchmark that
tested the full NPS mixed interactive and batch-processing
workload. This lack of a complex benchmark caused one
vendor to question the Navy. Along with their proposal
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PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. delivered a protest (a letter
from Cohen & White) which they wished to be considered if
they did not get the award. PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. felt
that IBM may have been able to offer a processor below the
capacity needed at the NPS but which could pass the
benchmark. Actually this did not occur and all of the
offers were in the capacity range needed at the NPS and
the award to PacifiCorp Capital offering Amdahl equipment
went unprotested. The major lesson learned by ADPSO was
that in the future, a more comprehensive benchmark would
be appropriate and that the full requirement could be
tested.
Though vendors were cautioned with a contractual clause in
Section M (Evaluation for Award) of both the protested and
final RFPs stipulating that the Government reserved the
right tn award the contract based solely on proposal
evaluation and without discussion, ADPSO's procurement
strategy proved to be better than NRCC. The DoD FAR
52.215-16 (Contract Award) subsection (c) delineates
authorization for clause regarding awarding contract
without discussion. The key to ADPSO's success was the
timely release of the draft RFP along with the
requirements analysis and proposed benchmark released to
industry for comment in accordance with the settlement
agreement. The comments from vendors were reviewed and
implemented into the final RFP. Since the NPS RTP
received so much attention and "grooming", there was no
dispute by vendors over its contents and therefore the
time elapsed from RFP release to award was extremely
short. With this strategy, ADPSO was able to satisfy
vendors who wanted the specifications written in a fair
manner.
2. Froia thA DoN ADP AAP perspective:
* In the past, what the Government lost in awarding
contracts based on unnecessarily restrictive requirements
was not the value of the contracts themselves, but
whatever opportunity may have existed to achieve lower
prices in those cases through greater competition.
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3. From the DONIRM perspective:
" Serious mistakes were made in the past. Lower level Navy
acquisition officials tried to short-circuit contracting
procedures by unfairly tailoring specifications to benefit
IBM products. "There is a natural tendency for
[management] to stick with the system they've got." [Ref.
ll:p. 18]
* The DoN estimates that some 15,000 man-hours and more than
$500,000 was expended responding to the Congress and to
protest issues regarding IBM bias.
4. From the GSA perspective:
" Be prepared for a protest the day the procurement is
initiated. Assume that your procurement will be protested
in some fashion, shape, or form. There is no such thing
as a completely fool-proof acquisition and each
procurement is unique. The days of copious amounts of
federal dollars available for the acquisition of ADP
equipment are gone forever. Protests are now a way of life
and the bigger the contract, the greater the risk for
protest.
" Prepare your legal counsel attorneys for the case after
ensuring that they have litigation experience and a
technical background. Keep in mind that the organization
initiating the protest will have highly proficient,
professional lawyers handling their case. These lawyers
execute the legal aspects of procurement protests for a
living. They are professional and competent. Do not
expect anything less of their capabilities.
" Attorneys employed by the federal Government generally do
not have the experience advantage enjoyed by the computer
industry's legal counsels. This means that chances are
high that the federal Government will become the losers in
a GSBCA case.
" Spend time getting organized and devise a well organized
method for dealing with the large volumes of paper that
will be handled by the agency seeking procurement.
* Establish a meticulous filing plan and a system for
discarding documents that are no longer needed by the
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requesting agency. As is true in any Government
inspection remains true here; if you possess something
which the inspector can see, it is vulnerable to scrutiny.
" Have legal counsel attorneys prepare you for giving
depositions and trial testimony. Answers to likely
questions must be rehearsed until they are committed to
memory.
" Become proficient at understanding the language of the
protests. Common English language terms do not
necessarily mean what you think when used in a cleverly
devised legal document.
" Work together as a team and support one another. During
a protest is not the time to become unraveled or to begin
acting selfishly. Keep in mind that soon after the onset
of the protest all team members will begin to feel the
effects of the litigation.
5. From the NPS perspective:
* The procurement technical team must fully understand and
appreciate that undertaking a procurement task of $10-14
million will be time consuming, exhausting, and require
extreme amounts of consistent effort. A large proportion
of the time will be expended while attempting to gather
corroborative data which will be used to support official
documentation such as the benchmark and requirements
analysis. The corroborative data comes in terms of
testimony from knowledgeable users. The school's workload
would change dramatically to take advantage of the major
increase in computer processing power and storage
capacity. Running present programs would not be
representative of expected future loads.
* Write the requirements analysis, all memorandums, letters,
and other official documentation as though you were
writing it to be scrutinized by a judge. It is very
likely that this could be true if the procurement is
protested. The protestor in the mainframe procurement
made no attempt to go to the contracting office or GSA
prior to going to the GSBCA. They could have requested
guidance from FEDSIM but they chose to protest
immediately.
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* Benchmark requirements must be directly related to the
requirements analysis with little or no differential in
the intended interpretation. All requirements must be
delineated clearly in both of these documents which are
key to the procurement. NPS benchmarked scientific and
engineering applications in a research environment.
* In accordance with federal instructions and regulations,
procuring agencies are required to submit documents such
as the Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS), Abbreviated
Systems Decision Paper (ASDP), Requirements Analysis (RA),
and Software Conversion (SWC) study up the chain of
command for proper review and staffing. When the NPS
protest came to light, all the upper echelon bureaus acted
as if they were surprised at the situation and as if they
themselves had not reviewed the documentation and passed
it on. When asked why they were behaving in such a
manner, these same agencies replied in a manner to
suggest, "If we had known the requirements read that way
we would have held them up." They ran for cover and left
us out there all alone to fight for ourselves.
6. From the NRCC perspective:
SI.gencies should not depend on the NRCC to be a source of
xtended technical assistance. They are undermanned and
the technical expertise of the contracting staffs is very
.Limited. They rely heavily on the ability of the
requesting agency to specify written requirements
,-orrectly and unrestrictively thus ensuring full and open
:ompetition. This is especially true with regard to the
-ritical sections of the RFP (sections C, L, and M) which
,4arrant meticulous attention to detail by the requesting
igency.
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VII. CASE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This case study of the NPS mainframe procurement presented
a real life example of ADPE procurement and demonstrated how
time consuming and complex a process it can be. The
procurement was presented in case study format and an analysis
was provided. Lessons learned in this procurement case were
also provided.
Technological changes in software, hardware, and firmware
have resulted in complex ADPE solicitations. They have caused
an increase in the number and complexity of rules,
regulations, and instructions associated with the procurement
of ADPE. From the instant that a decision is made to automate
or make major system revisions, the Navy's ADPE procurement
process becomes a maze of rigid controls and regulations. The
end result is a time consuming, inefficient, and less than
effective process.
The Navy's procurement process is far from being flawless.
Confusion results due to misunderstanding of the existing
regulations. First, a person assigned to procure a unit of
major ADPE may do so only once in a career. This leads to
personnel unfamiliar with the current trends in an ever-
changing procurement system. In this case, the PM's
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experience was well above the average. This being his third
major ADPE procurement he quickly learned that the regulations
and trends had changed.
Secondly, many of the people working in the area of ADPE
procurement, at both the requesting agency and contracting
level, lack technical understanding of system functionality
and knowledge regarding the federal ADPE acquisition and
budget process.
Third, the documentation used by agencies is not standard
throughout the federal Government and therefore uncontrollable
disparities in procurement actions continue to be a matter of
serious concern. A consolidated effort should be made to
develop a single system of instructions which pertain to all
phases of the Navy ADPE acquisition process, making them more
concise, logical, and easier to read. A "how-to" manual or
other document delineating the steps and approvals needed in
the acquisition of ADPE would be extremely beneficial to
agencies not fully comprehending their responsibilities in the
procurement process.
Fourth, today's budget dollars are scarce. There is not
enough money to go around to facilitate properly conducted and
researched studies that fully investigate and substantiate the
requirements that a requesting agency may have. ADPE
procurement is not a support function for Navy enterprises.
The role ADPE plays in the Navy far exceeds the casual concept
of being merely a support function. In most cases, ADPE is
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the major reason for the existence of certain Governmental
organizations and entities such as the DoN's Office of
Information Resources Management. As long as the federal
Government views its role as one of promoting competition
within the computer industry, emphasis by vendors protesting
ADPE procurements are bound to continue.
The Navy would benefit tremendously from a pilot training
program for those individuals responsible for correctly
executing the procurement process for ADPE. Such a training
program should be mandatory for procurement experts and
computer project managers directly involved in the overall
process.
This thesis attempted to present the facts surrounding the
NPS mainframe procurement so that the reader would be able to
see that the PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. protest was virtually
unnecessary. All disputed issues could have been resolved via
negotiat'on with NPS and the respective contracting office,
NRCC Detachment Long Beach.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This case study dealt with only one of many troubled IBM
plug-compatible procurements in the DoN. The conclusions
reached in this thesis are therefore limited and are the views
of the author. The perspectives of other individuals
representing key federal agencies responsible for ADPE
procurement were also presented. The overall case presented
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in this thesis is only a small version of the grand scheme of
problems present in the DoN ADP infrastructure.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In conducting this research, evidence was uncovered that
indicates problems exist in the DoD and in other branches and
agencies of the federal Government with regard to IBM bias in
the plug-compatible mainframe arena. Future research in
analyzing DoD or federal IBM plug-compatible mainframe
procurements using case study methodology is highly
recommended.
D. CASE RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are organized by Government
activity. Several agencies provided recommendations with
regard to federal ADPE procurements. These various offices
include ADPSO, DoN ADP AAP, and the Office of Secretary of the
Air Force (SecAF), Office of General Counsel (Procurement).
1. From the ADPSO perspective:
Users should and are required to survey the
marketplace to determine the competition available. If there
is limited competition, ensure that the requirement is a true
need. If the requirement can only be fulfilled by one vendor,
justify sole source and buy accordingly. There is no way to
always avoid protests. But a thorough examination of a user's
true requirements and a market survey help tremendously.
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2. From the DoN ADP AAP perspective:
In order to minimize the risks of writing restrictive
specifications, requiring agencies should allow the GSA FEDSIM
Center and the experts who work in the area of ADPE
acquisitions the opportunity to provide independent
specification consultation and to review the critical
procurement documents such as the MENS, requirements analysis,
alternative analyses, feasibility studies, cost/benefit
analysis, systems decision papers, benchmark technique
criteria, draft RFPs, acquisition plans and strategies, and
proposal evaluations for correctness and completeness. FEDSIM
will review these documents, point out potentially restrictive
aspects, and advise the activity on appropriate revisions to
enhance competition. Requiring activities will be expected to
reimburse the GSA for services rendered.
Functional specifications need to be reflected in the
requirements. MIPS and MFLOPS do not specify functional
requirements. Functional requirements must be documented,
substantiated, and verified. Agencies must understand that
the bigger the contract, the greater the risk for protest.
Therefore, requirements and specifications must be completely
defined.
Take full advantage of marketplace capabilities by
improving planning and execution of ADP acquisitions. An
improved dialogue with industry should be developed. In 1988,
the "Gang of Six" vendors complained to SecDef Carlucci that
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the Navy's procurement of the Inventory Control Points (ICP)
system and the Stock Point ADP Replacement (SPAR) program of
1984 and 1987 respectively, were IBM biased procurements. The
ICP procurement was worth $447.9 million and the SPAR
procurement was a 12-year contract worth $543.4 million.
However, the DoN ADP AAP speaks highly for NAVSUP in that they
made good use of the draft RFP and feedback received from
specification review conferences with industry. The ICP and
SPAR procurements came under scrutiny by the House
Subcommittee for Legislation and National Security during
their 1989-1990 hearings but was cleared of any malfeasance.
3. From the DONIRM perspective:
Do not slant the specifications towards any one
vendor. Keep the playing field level by having specifications
technically reviewed to ensure non-bias, non-restrictive,
requirements. Any requirement specification which appears to
give any vendor an advantage or the upper hand in a
procurement should be thrown out.
Do not underestimate the power of politics. The
action of faculty members at NPS maintaining professional
relationships and contact with IBM (which were entirely
appropriate in an academic institution) was a case of a
situation blown out of proportion especially so since it had
no bearing on the procurement of the mainframe.
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4. From the FEDSIM perspective:
Ensure that requirement analysis and benchmark
criteria are compatible. In the NPS procurement, the
requirements analysis stipulated both interactive and batch-
processing work. The benchmark tests placed emphasis on the
need to prove capabilities to execute scientific and
engineering computation tasks.
With regard to ADPE procurement, Navy agencies receive
different input from Congress, GAO, GSA, and DoD. Therefore,
agencies must try their best to keep the playing fields level,
specify their requirements, and try to keep the procurement as
clean as possible.
5. From the "Gang of Six" perspective:
Use the draft specification phase to obtain industry
comment with the purpose not only of correcting those defects
but to promote full and open competition. This could
eliminate amendments to the formal RFP. Also the draft RFP
should contain everything except boiler plate so that contract
structure, evaluation model etc., can be commented on. These
are equally important parts of the process.
Perform complete market surveys prior to drafting the
initial specifications to insure that all competitors have a
chance to compete. There are at most three manufacturers of
the major 370 architecture systems. Each should be able to
present its products and review the specification for areas
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which would make them non-responsive. This should be part of
an affirmative effort by Gcvernment managers to familiarize
themselves with the competitive alternatives.
Procurement personnel should be briefed on the market
structure of the ADP industry segment they are dealing with
and updated periodically on changes in products and the
structure of the marketplace.
Procurement personrel should be encouraged to remain
abreast and be briefed on the abuses that users may attempt in
the process.
Procurement personnel should be rewarded for
identifying abuses (and not be dependent on the users for
recognitiun) . A system should be developed in cooperatgon
with the competition advocates.
Vendor comments should be treated more seriously
during the procurement process as a source to assist in the
identification of abuses. Too often the using activitieb
dismiss valid comments as self serving only.
Procurement organizations should have more authority
to modify specifications to promote full and open competiticn.
To accomplish This they need greater technical resources or
access to technical resources other than those of the buying
act ivity.
Develop specifications which eliminate all of the
abuses enumerated.
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ADPSO is the only cc:ntral selection office within the
DoN with a career military officer in command who is routinely
rotated out. Either the rotation should be eliminated to
insure continuity or the position given to a permanent
civilian head.
6. From the GSA perspective:
Communicate better with industry and with the federal
Government agencies responsible for overseeing ADPE
acquisition to ensure that everyone understands requirements
and needs. Define requirements up front and do not waiver on
them. Therefore, vendors will not feel they are being treated
unfairly. This action alone will not prevent protests but it
will help to minimize them.
7. From the NPS perspective:
This case was highlighted by the political
grandstanding of the industry. Certain individuals were
instrumental in using opportune situations in their favor and
by using the media, politics, and other previous situations
such as the "Gang of Six" case as ammunition to draw closer
scrutiny to the NPS mainframe buy. Recommend the release of
a draft RFP by the contracting office in future mainframe
computer procurement3. Releasing draft RFPs were rft common
in procurements until 1990, when it became standard practice
by contracting offices in the wake of the "Gang of Six" issue,
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8. From the NRCC perspective:
Know exactly what the procurement requirement entails,
know what kind of specifications are requir-d, and tailor
those specifications to your solicitation document. Once this
is underway, keep in mind the that competition is a priority
(unless sole source) and review the requirements to ensure
they promote full and open competition.
After solicitation for procurement 1-as been made
public, questions from potential bidders often arise.
Requesting agencies should be advised of these questions.
Peview them thoroughly and provide answers to each potential
bidder. Often bidders will ask for clarification of the
spgcifications and they will indeed be found to be in error.
If corrections can be made to the specifications prior to the
deadline for RFP solicitation, some of the potential problems
can be eliminated.
At the beginning of the procurement process, the
contracts agent should discuss with the requesting agency, any
aspects of the specifications which appear to be ambiguous or
questionable.
Each major procurement action should include a team of
sufficient size where the technical responsibilities are
considerably distributed and thus preclude the potential of
overburdening any one individual.
The procurement activities should be checked or
audited at predetermined points by an internal review board or
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technical and legal panel of the best personnel the requesting
agency can muster. This would be an opportunity to attempt to
detect and eliminate potential problems that previously went
unheeded. It would be cheaper overall to conduct business
this way simply because it would save time and money.
9. From the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
(SecAF), Office of General Counsel (Procurement)
perspective:
Anyone involved in procurements of ADP resources
should be intimately familiar with the Brooks Act, the
procurement regulations, and the significant GSBCA decisions.
[Ref. 12 :p. 28]
This thesis presented a detailed case study and analysis
which will provide people responsible for ADPE procurement in
both the federal Government and in the civilian sector with a
view of how the acquisition process may function.
The practice of ADPE procurement in the federal Government
is extensive and widespread. The lessons learned and
recommendations presented in this thesis will prove to be
helpful; however, they are in no way to construed as being
thoroughly complete and exhaustive.
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A. KEY EVENTS OF NPS MAINFRAME PROCUREMENT
Jul 1985 Plans to acquire new mainframe formulated
May 1986 MENS approved by NMPC (OP-16)
Nov 1987 Analysis of Alternatives and ASDP drafted
and submitted
Jan 1988 Analysis of Alternatives, and ASDP approved
by OP-09BF, NMPC (OP-16), and NAVDAC
18 Mar 1988 DPA received from GSA under case number KMA-
88-0202
4 Aug 1988 Draft of the RFP sections C,L, and M
delivered to NRCC Long Beach
15 Mar 1989 NPS RFP SD Number N00123-88-R-1013 issued by
NRCC
Apr 1989 DoN ADP AAP established to review Navy and
Marine Corps solicitations for IBM bias
11 Apr 1989 PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. protested the NPS
solicitation
14 Apr 1989 GSBCA suspends NPS mainframe procurement
30 Apr 1989 NRCC legal counsel inadvertently faxed
communique to PacifiCorp Capital, Inc.
attorneys
11 May 1989 DoN and PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. reached an
out of court settlement
12 May 1989 NRCC canceled the NPS solicitation in
accordance with settlement agreement
8 Sep 1989 DoN ADP AAP begins review of the NPS
mainframe procurement
Nov 1989 ADPSO assigned to handle the NPS follow-on
procurement
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Mar 1990 NPS procurement project
received at ADPSO
6 Apr 1990 Copies of draft RFP, RA, and benchmark
released for industry comments
9 May 1990 Industry comments received
13 Jul 1990 Final RFP released
13 Aug 1990 Offers (including technical and cost
proposals) received
24 Aug 1990 Ranking of Offers determined
10/11 Sep 1990 Pre-award benchmark testing performed
21 Sep 1990 Mainframe contract awarded to PacifiCorp
Capital, Inc. for Amdahl 5990-500 computer
Dec 1990 NPS accepted delivery of Amdahl 5990-500
computer
B. POLITICAL ISSUES COMPLICATING PROCUREMENT
1988 Navy IG investigates Computer Science
Department incident regarding improper
handling of funds donated by IBM.
4 Oct 1988 PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. protests Navy $150
million for DPI-ET Phase III
17 Nov 1988 "Gang of Six" letter delivered to SecDef
Carlucci
8 Dec 1988 GSBCA rules in favor of PacifiCorp Capital,
Inc. in DPI-ET Phase III case
Feb 1989 House Subcommittee for Legislation and
National Security begins IBM bias
investigation
Apr 1989 Navy IG investigates NPS for IBM bias based
on PacifiCorp Capital, Inc. Letter of
Protest to GSBCA.
19 Apr 1988 Explosion in 16-inch gun turret aboard USS
Iowa (BB-61) claims lives of 47 sailors
8o
9 May 1989 Fire in engine room aboard USS White Plains
(AFS-4) claims the life of six sailors
14 May 1989 Explosion and fire aboard aircraft carrier
USS America (CV-66) claims the lives of two
crew members
Jul 1989 HASC responds to GAO reports on mismanage-
ment in DoD
May 1990 Navy cancels DPI-ET Phase III solicitation
2 Aug 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait
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A. NAVY ADP ACQUISITION PROCESS
The following provides a list of key events and documents
in the acquisition process for Navy ADP procurements. A
procurement the size of the NPS mainframe computer acquisition
(originally estimated at $10-14 million) normally takes one
year to be completed. The procurement clock starts from the
time the procurement request is submitted to the contracting
agency until the time the contract is awarded.
" Procurement Request (PR) including:
Statement of Work (SOW) and
Financial Accounting Data (FAD) Sheet
" Procurement Planning Conference (PPC)
* Synopsize in Commerce Business Daily
" Draft Request For Proposal (RFP)
" Discussions with industry vendors
" RFP Release
" Vendor (Contractor) Proposal submission
" Proposal Evaluation (cost and technical)
" Source Selection





A particular procurement process may be accelerated and be
completed in less than one year if the following criteria are
met:
" discussions between the requesting industry are open and
thorough;
" the number of vendors bidding is few;
* a draft RFP is initially submitted to industry for
comments;
" evaluations of the proposals are simple and
uncontroversial;
" workload of contracting office allows for expeditious
processing of proposals.
The procurement process may be delayed for the following
reasons:
" protests;
" large number of bidders;
" difficult or complex evaluation process;
* failure to negotiate;
" failure to plan.
As was learned in the case of the NPS mainframe
procirement, the time span, after the protest settlement,
between procurement request and award to PacifiCorp Capital,
Inc. was approximately six months. The accelerated pace of
this procurement process was unique in that ADPSO released the
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draft PrP, requirements analysis, and proposed benchmark for
industry comments and suggestions. ADPSO also provided
priority handling of all activities.
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APPENDIX E
A. PACIFICORP CAPITAL, INC. LETTER OF PROTEST
GSBCA Solicitation No. N00123-88-R-1013
PacifiCorp Capital, Inc., (PacifiCorp) 1801 Robert Fulton
Drive, Third Floor, Reston, Virginia 22091-4347, by its
attorneys, hereby protests the award of any contract under the
above-captioned solicitation. PacifiCorp is a systems
integrator which has submitted numerous bids and proposals in
federal ADP procurements, including procurements for IBM
compatible hardware and software. The solicitation requests
proposals to replace two IBM 3033 mainframe computers. The
winning vendor must provide central processing units, software
and maintenance. The contract is worth approximately $12-14
million. The procurement is being conducted by the Naval
Regional Contracting Center Long Beach on behalf of the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey which will use the procured
computers for instructional, research and other purposes.
This procurement is essentially an IBM sole source
disguised as a competitive acquisition. As alleged more fully
herein, certain specifications were apparently inserted for
the sole purpose of restricting this procurement to IBM.
Moreover, the Naval Postgraduate School has displayed a
pattern of bias in its acquisition of IBM products. This
procurement is the latest result of that bias.
As described in the RFP, the computer facility at Naval
Postgraduate School consists primarily of IBM hardware and
software. The equipment list contained in the RFP indicates
that the Naval Postgraduate School has not acquired any
products from the competitors of IBM who manufacture IBM
compatible central processors and peripheral storage
equipment. The school's clear bias manifested itself recently
in a protest filed with this Board involving an RFP containing
specifications which restricted IBM compatible vendors from
competing. See Storage Technology Corporation, GSBCA No.
P764-P (filed November 12,1986). The case was settled in the
protester's favor when the Naval Postgraduate School agreed to
remove a restrictive specification. However, the Navy never
sent the amendment containing the revised requirement to
StoraaeTek. In the absence of a StorageTek bid, award was
made to IBM.
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In addition, the pro-IBM bias at the Postgraduate School
has led Navy officials to solicit the IBM Corporation for
funds to support the school's activities. The funds received
from IBM were deposited in an unauthorized account maintained
by a foundation especially set up by Navy officials. The
monies from IBM were used to support a workshop and other
official activities of the Naval Postgraduate School. One of
the key Navy officials involved in soliciting money from IBM
had previously been an IBM employee for over 20 years. This
individual also signed a consulting contract with IBM during
the period in which the solicitation and disbursement of IBM
funds occurred. Although a subsequent investigation of these
activities by the Navy Inspector General did not find any
evidence of criminal activity, the Navy IG did find violations
of Executive Order 11222 and numerous official instructions
issued by the Secretary of the Navy. The IG specifically
stated that the Postgraduate School's conduct in connection
with a workshop funded by IBM "resulted in or gave the clear
appearance of: (a) preferential treatment to IBM..."
The Board must use the full reach of its powers to prevent
the bias displayed by the Naval Postgraduate School from
irremediably marring the protested procurement. Only drastic
relief which includes removing the procurement from the
individuals who have directed it to date--can provide any
assurance that the Navy will achieve full and open competition
for this acquisition.
B. INFORMATION REQUIRED BY Board RULE 7(b)(2)
Rule 7(b) (2) (i): The name of the person signing this
protest on behalf of PacifiCorp is David S. Cohen. Mr.
Cohen's address is Cohen & White, Suite 504, 1055 Thomas
Jefferson Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007, and his
telephone number is (202) 342-2550. The fax number for Cohen
& White is (202)342-6147.
Rule 7(b) (2) (ii): The number of the protested solicitation
is RFP No. N00123-88-R-1013. The date of issuance was on or
about March 15, 1989. Proposals were initially due on April
14, 1989. On April 7, 1989, the Navy sent out a mailgram
notifying vendors that it would issue Amendment 2 to answer
vendor questions regarding the RFP. The closing date was
extended to April 28, 1989.
Rule 7(b) (iii) : A contract has not been awarded.
Rule 7 (b) (iv) : The RFP was issued by the Naval Regional
Contracting Center Detachment, Long Beach, California 90822-
5095. The solicitation number is N00123-88-R-1013. The
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contract specialist is Karen Simpson. On information and
belief, the contracting officer is Dorothy Rogers. The address
for Ms. Simpson and Ms. Rogers is L211B, Naval Regional
Contracting Center Detachment, Long Beach, California 90829-
5095. The telephone number is (213) 547-7584.
Rule 7(b)(v): The grounds of protest are set forth below.
Rule 7 (b) (2) (vi) : PacifiCorp's protest is timely filed.
This protest challenges the use of restrictive specifications
in the above-captioned procurement. It is being filed prior
to the time and date for proposal submission. PacifiCorp has
not protested this procurement to the General Accounting
Office.
Rule 7 (b) (2) (vii) : A hearing is requested to determine
whether procurement authority should be suspended pending the
Board's decision on the merits of this protest. A hearing on
the merits of the protest is requested.
C. GROUNDS FOR PROTEST
1. The RFP.
1. The protested procurement is being conducted by the
Naval Regional Contracting Center Detachment Long Beach (NRCC
Long Beach) on behalf of the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California. The acquired computers will be
installed in the Postgraduate School's Computer Center. The
Computer Center presently "provides all of the general
services computing support for the instructional and research
programs of the school, and the data base and management
information systems of the major tenant activity, the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC)." RFP N00123-88-R-1013
(hereinafter, "RFP") at 4.
2. The Naval Postgraduate School Computer Center
presently utilizes IBM hardware and software to provide
service for its users. As described in the RFP, "Most of the
Center's computing services are provided on a network of IBM
mainframe computers-IBM 3033 Model API6, 3033 U16 and 4381
Q13-connected by an IBM 3088 Multi-System Channel
Communications Unit (MCCU)." RFP at 4. The RFP lists the
hardware and software presently available at the Center. See
RFP at 6,8. With only minor exceptions, all of the hardware
and software listed in the RFP are products of the IBM
Corporation.
3. The processors procured under the RFP will be used
to replace the IBM 3033 Model AP16 and the 3033 U16. The
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migration path which the procurement contemplates is set forth
on page 97 of the RFP:
Months after Award Equipment
1 INITIAL CONFIGURATION
40 MIPS
128 MB Main Storage
256 MB Extended Storage
32 channels
All software in Schedule B except UNIX
13 **Expansion to
60 MIPS




512 MB expanded storage
37 Expansion to
80 MIPS
512 MB main storage
48 channels
49 Expansion to
1 GB expanded storage
* Coinciding with removal of the IBM 3033 U16
**Coinciding with removal of the IBM 3033 AP16.
4. This migration path will produce a dramatic
increase in the processing power available at the Center
beginning in Month 1. The combined MIPS (millions of
instructions per second) of the present processors installed
at the Center is approximately 17. The initial processor
which replaces the IBM 3033 U16 must provide at least 40 MIPS.
This will produce an immediate increase of approximately 300%
in the processing power available at the Computer Center. The
RFP does not give any indication as to what, if any, workload
studies justify this enormous jump in computer resources.
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2. Restrictive Requirements
a. The Vector Processor Requirements
5. The RFP also required vendors to propose hardware
or software to provide vector processing and/or parallel
computation. RFP at 16. Vector processing is a specialized
form of data processing which utilizes vectors to perform a
large number of mathematical or algebraic computations at high
speeds. The RFP allowed vendors to either propose a vector
processing element which was integrated into the proposed CPUs
or an extremely high performance scalar processor. On
information and belief, there is no scalar uniprocessor that
could meet the RFP's performance requirements.
6. PacifiCorp is a systems integrator. PacifiCorp
does not have a business relationship with IBM which would
permit it to bid IBM products for this procurement. The only
competitive proposal which PacifiCorp could theoretically make
is one that included processors manufactured by Amdahl or by
National Advanced System (NAS). Both Amdahl and NAS
manufacture or are able to propose vector processors which
could meet the Navy's functional requirement.
7. However, the Navy has attempted to exclude both
Amdahl and NAS from this procurement by manipulating the
vector processor requirements so as to rule out the likely
machines which Amdahl and NAS could propose in response to the
Navy's requirements.
8. On or about March 16, 1988, representatives of the
Amdahl Corporation conducted a briefing for officials of the
Naval Postgraduate School. The briefing, which took place
approximately one year before the Navy issued the RFP,
included a discussion of Amdahl's methods of providing vector
processing capability. Amdahl manufactures its own line of
vector processors which operate under the IBM MVS/XA operating
system. This line of processors does not operate under the
IBM VM operating system. The protested RFP requires VM/XA
support, and effectively prohibits Amdahl from bidding its own
vector processor.
9. Amdahl has also supplied vector or array processors
manufactured by other corporations in response to customer
needs for high speed, complex processing. These vector
processors are connected to the Amdahl central processing unit
through one of the channels in the Amdahl CPU.
10. At the March meeting, Amdahl representatives
explained that these channel attached vector processors
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operated in a manner that was transparent to the user. Amdahl
also explained to the Navy that it does not offer integrated
vector facilities which operate under scalar processors; that
is, all of the vector processing proposed by Amdahl consists
of channel attached vector processors or independent vector
processors with only modest scalar capability.
11. On information and belief, the Navy used the
information conveyed at the March, 1988 briefing to develop
specifications which would exclude Amdahl from the
procurement. As finally issued, the RFP stated that the
vector processing requirement, "cannot be satisfied by a
vector/array processor, channel attached to the basic system
proposed to satisfy Hardware Requirements." RFP at 16.
12. On information and belief, the primary purpose
of the prohibition against channel attached vector processors
was to exclude Amdahl from this competition. Further, on
information and belief, the requirement directly resulted from
the pro-IBM bias of the Naval Postgraduate School personnel.
There is no rational basis for prohibiting channel attached
processors. Indeed, as late as October, 1988, the Naval
Postgraduate School had advertised a procurement for data
processing resources, which included among other items, a
network attached vector processor. The procurement is
currently on hold.
13. The RFP's vector processing requirements also
included a provision regarding the speed of the proposed
vector processor. The RFP contained a performance requirement
that adopted a standard test for measuring performance of
scientific processors. The result-s are expressed in MFLOPS,
that is, millions of floating point operations per second.
The RFP stated:
Regardless of the method of attainment, the
resulting high-performance computational
power must be a minimum of 30 MFLOPS per
processor when performing the LINPACK 30)
Test, i.e., full (64-bit) precision test wih
matrix-vector operations in all FORTRAN (non-
coded BLAS) with no compiler directives, for
a matrix of order 300 (Reference: I.
Dongarra, Performance of Various Computers
Usinq Standard Linear Equations Soft.ware in a
FORTRAN Environment, Argonne National Lab.,
Tech. Memo. No. 23, 1 August 1988 or later).
See Section H for further infermation.
RFP at 17.
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14. Section H embellished the basic requirement on
page 17 of the RFP by referring offerors specifically to Table
5 of the Argonne National Lab test reports:
To establish a given processor's power in
terms of MFLOPS, the Navy will accept either
(a) the rating published in Table 5 of the
report by Jack Dongarra, Performance of
Various Commuters Using Standard Linear
Equations Software in a FORTRAN Environment,
Tech. Memo 13, Argonne National Laboratory,
latest issue, or (b) documentation of actual
runs on the proposed processor(s) of the
LINPACK 300 case conducted by the offerors,
subject to verification/validation by
Government staff. Documentation must conform
to the requirements of Section C.
RFP at 59-60.
15. The most recent version of the referenced
Argonne National Laboratories Test is dated January 29, 1988.
Table 5 contains the results of tests conducted on numerous
machines. Many of those test results do not satisfy the RFP's
mandatory requirement because they were achieved using
software routines that are prohibited by the RFP. For
example, one of the ratings for the NAS EX 60 exceeds the
solicitation's 30 MFLOPS requirement, but that particular
rating cannot be considered because it was produced using
coded MV routines. Table 5 does, however, contain test
results for two machines which underlie IBM and NAS
configurations that could meet all requirements of the RFP.
The tests were conducted under software environments that meet
the RFP requirement set forth on page 16. The relevant
processors are the IBM 3090/180S and the NAS EX 60, which is
erroneously listed in the Argonne report as an AS/XL V60. The
IBM system is rated at 30 MFLOPS. The NAS machine is rated at
29 MFLOPS--a difference of approximately 3%. The IBM 180S
processor which meets the 30 MFLOPS requirement is the same
processor used in the IBM 3090/200S, which consists of two,
tightly coupled 180S processors. The IBM 3090/200S has a MIPS
rating of 40 MIPS, the exact MIPS requirement for the first
processor to be delivered in this procurement.
16. On information and belief the primary purpose
of the 30 MFLOPS requirement was to improve IBM's competitive
position in this procurement and to prevent NAS from bidding.
On information and belief, the data in the Argonne National
Labs report quoted above was available to Navy officials prior
to the issuance of the RFP. The only NAS system which could
provide a competitive solution to the initial MIPS and MFLOPS
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requirements of this procurement is the EX 80. This processor
consists of two EX 60s joined in a dyadic configuration.
Since the 30 MFLOPS requirement must be satisfied by each
processor, PacifiCorp would be unable to bid the NAS EX 80
unless NAS improved the machine's Argonne labs rating or was
able to demonstrate that the machine could satisfy the Argonne
labs requirement. In other words, PacifiCorp would be
effectively precluded from proposing a NAS solution in the
Navy procurement.
17. On information and belief, the Navy did not
know prior to the filing of this complaint that NAS is
currently able to meet the 30 MFLOPS requirement with the NAS
EX 80. NAS has been working to fine tune the performance of
its EX 60 so that the processor (which is used in the dyadic
NAS EX 80) can achieve the 30 MFLOPS threshold. PacifiCorp
understands that NAS has conducted internal tests which show
that the EX 60's performance can exceed 30 MFLOPS using the
precise tests required by the RFP.
18. Although the 30 MFLOPS requirement is no longer
an absolute bar to NAS' participation in this procurement, it
does prevent PacifiCorp from bidding NAS' most competitive
solution. The initial configuration, which is delivered in
the first month after award, must provide 40 MIPS of
processing power. NAS is able to satisfy this requirement
with its EX 70, a dyadic processor composed of two NAS EX 50s.
The EX 80, on the other hand, is a much more powerful machine
with a rating of 51 MIPS. There is a significant cost
differential between the EX 70 and EX 80. However, PacifiCorp
cannot propose the EX 80 under this REP because this
processor cannot provide a vector facility with a 30 MFLOPS
rating. The RFP, as presently worded, precludes all use of an
EX 70.
19. On information and belief, the RFP's 30 MFLOPS
requirement is not supported by the actual needs of the Naval
Postgraduate School, and is simply a performance specification
which helps define the initial IBM processor that the Navy
wants to buy. The RFP does not even indicate that the Navy
will take delivery of any vector facility during the first
thirteen months after contract award. Thus, under the
contract as awarded, the Navy may not actually buy any vector
facility prior to the upgrade of the first processor or at any
time thereafter. Moreover, the RFP provides no basis for the
Navy's determination that it needs a vector facility with a
rated speed of at least 30 MFLOPS.
20. The 30 MFLOPS requirertent is arbitrary and
irrational. The Argonne lab report specifically states that
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the LINPACK benchmarks cannot fairly represent processor
performance. The most current Argonne report states
The timing information presented here should
in no way be used to judge the overall
performance of a computer system. The
results reflect only one problem area:
solving dense systems of equations using the
LINPACK [I] programs in a FORTRAN
environment.
21. And even this limited measure of performance
may produce results which can best be described as perverse.
A footnote to table 5 of the Argonne labs report notes the
following results of the LINPACK tests described therein for
certain Cray processors:
The major difference between the CRAY 1-M and
CRAY I-S is in the memory speed, the CRAY 1-M
havinQ slower memory. The timinQs show the
CRAY 1-M to be faster than the CRAY 1-S.
After much discussion and examination of the
generated assembly language code it was
determined that, in fact, the CRAY 1-M was
faster for program. The code generated by
the compiler causes the CRAY 1-S to miss a
chain-slot. On the CRAY l-M, because of the
slower memory, the chain-slot is not missed,
thus the faster execution time.
(Emphasis added).
22. The 30 MFLOPS requirement is also irrational
because of the way it is stated. As defined in the RFP, the
requirement is stated on a per processor basis. This means
that the number of MFLOPS available to Navy users will vary
depending on the particular architecture which a vendor
selects. For example, a vendor offering a three processor
configuration would be required to provide a total of 90
MFLOPS. A vendor meeting the same requirement with only two
processors would be required to provide only 60 MFLOPS. The
Navy's processing requirements do not vary by 30-50% depending
on the architecture of each vendor's solution.
23. The 30 MFL9FS requirement also fails to state
the Navy's needs in _,in-tional terms as required by
regulation. The Navy has not specified the extent to which
its workload requires vector processing--e.g., by stating a
number of hours that a vendor will have to provide vector as
opposed to scalar processing. If the Navy defined its
workload in functional terms, vendors could design the
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configuration which optimally suited the Navy's true
processing needs. And this solution might permit vendors to
propose vector facilities with less than 30 MFLOPS processing
power. It might also permit vendors to propose vector
processors operating under other IBM operating systems than
those specified in the REP, thereby increasing the number of
competitive solutions which could be proposed to meet the
Navy's functional requirement.
24. For these reasons, the 30 MFLOPS requirement
unreasonably restricts competition and is not rationally based
on the Navy's minimum needs. On information and belief, the
30 MFLOPS requirement results from the Navy 's pro-IBM bias
and is an effort by the Navy to insure that IBM wins this
procurement.
b. The Requirement for ESA
25. The RFP contains conflicting requirements for
the delivery of a new IBM operating system, ESA/370
(Enterprise Systems Architecture). ESA consists of two main
pieces of software: MVS/SP Version 3 and DFP Version 3.1. On
information and belief, IBM made MVS/SP Version 3 generally
available in September, 1988. First customer shipment of
MVS/SP Version 3 occurred at some time prior to September.
DFP Version 3.1 became generally available, on information and
belief, in December, 1988. First customer shipment of DFP
Version 3.1 occurred at some time prior to December, 1988.
26. In the IBM plug compatible industry, first
customer shipment generally refers to the shipment of software
to selected customers for field trials prior to general
release to all customers. The first customer shipment may
precede general availability by 3-6 months.
27. Although page 7 of the RFP requires ESA/370 to
be available on the proposed processors "within 12 months of
this general availability from IBM," other sections of the RFP
require availability of this product within 12 months of first
customer shipment. The first customer shipment date is not
stated in the solicitation. Thus, page 9 of the solicitation
requires the proposed CPUs to run "ESA/370 (Enterprise Systems
Architecture) and MVS/SP Version 3 within 12 months of its
first customer shipment by IBM." And the section of the RFP
labelled "Software Requirements" (page 12) requires support of
"new, announced SCPs such as MVS/ESA, within 12 months of
IBM's first customer shipment."
28. It is impossible for PacifiCorp to commit to
support ESA within 12 months of IBM's first customer shipment.
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Neither NAS nor Amdahl has committed to ESA support based on
the date of IBM's first customer shipment. No one except IBM
can even know when such shipments occur.
29. The ESA requirements are unreasonably
restrictive and are not supported by the legitimate needs of
the Naval Postgraduate School. On information and belief, the
Navy does not have any functional requirement for delivery of
ESA until the second half of 1990, at the earliest. The 3033
U16 which will be replaced in the initial delivery is
currently operating under MVS/SP Release 1.3 with JES 3
networking option. RFP at 4. The RFP requires vendors to
bring up another, and more recent, IBM operating system,
VM/SP-XA Release 2 within six months of initial installation.
RFP at 12. Once VM/SP-XA Release 2 is installed, the Navy's
programs must be converted to operate under the new operating
system in order to use the new features which this software
provides. The work to perform this conversion is not part of
the current RFP nor does the RFP give any indication that the
Navy has determined how to perform this conversion. The
conversion is likely to take three to six months. Thus, If a
vendor installs VM/SP-XA Release 2 in the sixth month, as the
RFP permits, the Navy's programs may not be fully operational
under the new operating system until June, 1990. And even if
the vendor installs VM/SP-XA Release 2 as described the RFP's
delivery scenario (which assumes installation in July, 1989),
the Navy's software will not be completely converted over to
until sometime in the fourth quarter of this year.
30. The conversion to VM/SP-XA Version 2 will give
the Navy considerably enhanced processing power. This
increase in processing resources provided by the Version 2
conversion makes it unlikely that the Navy will need to
undertake a quantum leap to another level of processing
capability for quite some time. For example, MVS/370 as used
by the Navy has limited address space for virtual storage and
may only permit 16 megabytes of address space, thus limiting
the type of applications which Navy users can bring up.
VM/SP-XA Version 2 will increase the Navy's virtual storage
addressing capacity from 16 million bytes to 2 gigabytes--that
is, 2 billion bytes of storage. There is nothing in the RFP
which suggests that this enormous jump in capacity cannot
satisfy the Navy's needs for virtual storage address space for
a considerable length of time. Without some showing of need,
the Navy cannot justify a jump to another operating system
after it has just acquired considerably more processing
resources. The Navy has no valid reason to require ESA
installation within 12 months of first customer shipment.
31. The Navy's position on ESA should be contrasted
with its "requirement" for UNIX. As set forth on page 97 of
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the RP, vendors are required to provide UNIX Operating System
support beginning in month 13. IBM currently does not support
the required release of UNIX and is not likely to announce
such support until the summer of 1989 with delivery likely 12
months after announcement. However, Amdahl is currently able
to support a version of defined in the RFP. PacifiCorp
further understands that Amdahl is willing to license this
software to IBM. Notwithstanding the current availability of
the software specified in the RFP, the Navy has postponed its
UNIX requirement until IBM is likely to offer its own version
of UNIX required by the Navy.
c. The Requirement to Incorporate All Announced
Engineering Changes Prior to Demonstration.
32. The Navy recently issued Amendment 1 to the
protested solicitation which effectively moves the required
date for ESA availability up well before twelve months from
first customer shipment. The Amendment, which had the stated
purpose of correcting "administrative errors," also contained
the following certification entitled "Engineering Changes":
The offeror certifies that all Engineering Changes
(ECs) that have been announced by the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) on or before the date of
proposal submission shall have been made to the
equipment ordered under any contract resulting from
this solicitation. These EC's shall also be
incorporated into the offered equipment used for the
line [sic, presumably live] test demonstration
required by this solicitation.
33. Both NAS and Amdahl have already announced
future support for IBM's MVS/ESA operating system. This
support is implemented through engineering changes that alter
the microcode, firmware, or printed circuit boards of the NAS
and Amdahl processors. It will be impossible for either NAS
or Amdahl to incorporate these changes into the equipment
which is subject to benchmark within the time frame specified.
The Navy has reserved the right to require a live test
demonstration within seven days after proposal submission.
RFP, Attachment 2. This schedule effectively requires Amdahl
and NAS to implement ESA on their processors by May 5, 1989.
The requirement is impossible, unreasonably restrictive and
can only be satisfied by IBM.
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d. The Navy's Migration Path for Additional
Processors Unfairly Favors IBM.
34. Procurements of IBM and IBM compatible
processors frequently use performance and design
specifications to describe the desired processors. The
specifications used for this purpose are MIPS (the processor's
rated speed expressed in millions of instructions per second),
the amount of main storage provided, and the number of CPU
channels. By manipulating these specifications, a procurement
can be effectively wired to impose significant competitive
burdens on unwanted manufacturers. Manufacturers develop
their pricing based on performance levels (the so-called
price/performance ratio) . The price of CPUs will inci ase as
the CPU's power increases. Although the IBM compatible
vendors all offer product lines which are roughly comparable
to each other, none of the performance specifications for each
vendor's machines line up exactly
35. As a result, a specification which requires a
vendor to propose a processor rated at 40 MIPS or more can
give significant competitive benefits to the manufacturer of
the 40 MIPS machine. The same requirement imposes competitive
handicaps on manufucturers who must propose machines with more
than the required number of MIPS because they do not have
machines rated at exactly the number specified in the
solicitation.
36. As shown in detail below, the Navy has used
specifications from the IBM product line to define its
proposed upgrade or migration strategy. On information and
belief, the Navy specified its upgrade requirements based on
the performance characteristics of the IBM product line,
rather than any legitimate analysis of its present and future
requirements. Indeed, the combination of three
specifications--30 MFLOPS, 40 MIPS and a limitation of the
initial configuration to no more than a dyadic processor--
exactly specifies the IBM 200S. In all but one instance, the
targeted IBM processor exactly meets the Navy's MIPS, memory
and channel requirements, whereas an offeror of competing,
plug compatible processors must offer a machine with
significantly more power and sometimes channels. In each
instance, the plug compatible solution requires PacifiCorp
propose a processor which exceeds the minimum requirements.
As a result, the plug compatible alternatives must overcome a
significant cost burden defined by the Navy's "requiremen+-."
37. The Navy's "requirements," and the probable
vendor solutions, are outlined below. The viability of the
vendor solutions listed below assumes that the other
restrictions described in this complaint are removed. The '+"
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indicates an addition to the vendor's configuration to meet
the requirements of the Navy's specifications. We have
highlighted the areas in which the plug compatible vendors are
clearly disadvantaged.
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Contract Month 1 Requirement:
40 MIPS, 128 MB (Main); 256 MB (Extended Storage (ES)) 32
Channels
IBM 200S Amdahl 5990-700 NAS EX 80
40 MIPS 63 MIPS 51 MIPS
128 MB (Main) 128 MB (Main) 384 MB (Main
and Extended)
256 MB (ES) 256 MB (ES)
32 channels 32 channels 32 channels
Contract Month 13 Requirement:
Expand to 60 MIPS; 256 MB (Main) 40 channels
(Addition of 20 MIPS, 128 MB (M); 8 channels)
IBM 180S+ Amdahl 5990-700 NAS EX 90
22 MIPS+ 63 MIPS 70 MIPS
128 MB (M) 256 MS (M)+ 512 MB+







Contract Month 25 Requirement:
Expand to: 512 MB (ES) (i.e., additional 256 MB (ES)).
IBM 180S Amdahl 5990-700 NAS EX 90
128 MB 256 MB (M) 768 MS+
256 MB (Es)+ 512 MB (ES)+






Contract Month 37 Requirement:
Expand to: 80 MIPS; 512 MB (M); 48 channels (i.e., add 20
MIPS; 256 MB (M) 8 channels).
IBM 200S (upgrade)+ Amdahl 1400 (upgrade)+ NAS EX 100
(upgrade) +
40 MIPS 105 MIPS 88 MIPS
256 MB (M)+ 512 MB (M)+ 1024 MB+
256 MB (ES) 512 MB (ES)







Contract Month 49 Requirement:
Expand to: 1 gigabyte ES (i.e., additional 512 MB of
extended storage).
IBM 200S Amdahl 5990-1400 NAS EX 100
256 MB (M) 512 MB (M) 1536 MB +
512 MS (ES) 1024 MS (ES)+






e. The RFP Fails to Define Critical Terms
38. The RFP defines certain key software requirements
with the catch-phrase "or equivalent" but does not specify
what equivalent means in the relevant context. For example,
the RFP requires vendors to support an IBM FORTRAN compiler or
equivalent. See RFP at 16. No one but IBM can support the
specified IBM compiler. The Navy has not defined the salient
characteristics of the "equivalent" compiler which it will
accept. Thus, a non-IBM vendor who must, of necessity,
propose an "equivalent" compiler, has no way of knowing what
the Naval Postgraduate School will accept.
39. The RFP also requires offeror to provide "an
extensive, high-performance, FORTRAN-library for scientific
and engineering problems such as IBM's Extended Scientific
Subroutine Library (ESSL) or equivalent." Id. Once again,
the salient characteristics which define an equivalent
subroutine library are not defined. Their content is left
solely to the interpretation of Navy officials at a facility
which has repeatedly demonstrated a pro-IBM bias.
3. The RFP Does Not Specify A Delivery Requirement for
the Vector Facility.
40. The Navy's RFP contains a serious defect in that
it does not state at what point in the system life the Navy
will evaluate the various vector processing elements that
offerors must supply. The evaluation scenario on page 97 of
the RFP contains no indication as to when the Navy intends to
install vector processing capability. The contract schedule
(page 2) lists the minimum quantity of vector processing
elements--and all other CLINs which will not be delivered with
the first CPU--as 0. Thus, it is reasonably clear that a
vendor is not required to deliver vector processing capability
with the first shipment. There is no indication as to when a
vendor should assume installation of vector capability. As a
result, it will be impossible to evaluate offerors on a common
basis, since each offeror must make different assumptions as
to when the vector facility will be required.
41. In addition, the Navy's failure to specify a
delivery schedule permits the Navy impermissible discretion to
evaluate vector processing in a manner which most favors IBM.
IBM's competitive position will be hurt depending on the
number of months in which the vector facility is evaluated.
This is because the solicitation is imposing evaluated cost
differentials on vendors' solutions based on their consumption
of power and cooling. IBM's vector facility requires more
power and cooling than the vector facilities offered by NAS.
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power and cooling than the vector facilities offered by NAS.
Thus, IBM faces an evaluation penalty each month in which its
vector is evaluated against NAS'. By failing to state the
number of months in which vector facilities will be evaluated,
the Navy has given itself the flexibility to define this
evaluation methodology however it wants after it sees the
numbers which IBM proposes. In this manner, the RFP permits
the Navy to manipulate the evaluation scenarios to the benefit
of IBM and to the detriment of a NAS solution.
4. The Naval Postgraduate School's Procurement of IBM
Products Has Been Fatally Flawed With Pro-IBM Bias.
42. This RFP is an example of the Naval Postgraduate
School's uninterrupted pattern of bias favoring acquisition of
IBM hardware and software. As described in the RFP, the
school's computer facility utilizes a network of IBM mainframe
computers connected by an IBM multi-system communication unit.
None of the school's central processors or tape or disk
storage devices were purchased from the competitors of IBM who
manufacture IBM compatible central processors and peripheral
storage equipment.
43. The plethora of IBM equipment at the Postgraduate
School is no accident. The school has employed a history of
procurement practices designed to elicit the same predictable
outcome--acquisition of IBM products. An example of the
school's ingrained bias was exposed in two related protests
recently filed with this Board regarding procurements where
the school was alleged to have improperly restricted
competition to IBM products. See Storaqe Technology
Corporation, GSBCA Nos. 8763-P, (filed November 6, 1986),
8764-P (filed November 12, 1986).
44. The first StoraQe TechnoloQy protest involved the
school's purchase of an IBM direct access storage device
(DASD) under a GSA schedule. IBM was given the order after
StorageTek's proposal was found unacceptable because its DASD
was not compatible with the school's existing IBM controller.
The school had not previously identified compatibility with
the IBM controller as a requirement. Notwithstanding,
StorageTek's proposal included providing a substitute "plug
compatible" controller at no cost. The school determined it
did not have adequate space for the no-cost controller.
45. Purchasing this IBM-made DASD was such a foregone
conclusion at the school that in another solicitation it
described the IBM DASD equipment as part of its existing
configuration. This description appeared in a solicitation
which was issued the school was still considering the
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StorageTek proposal for the DASD equipment, and a full month
before it notified StorageTek that its proposal was
unacceptable.
46. The solicitation containing the description of
the IBM DASD became the subject of StorageTek's second
protest. In this solicitation, again for DASD equipment, the
school specifically required compatibility with its IBM
storage controllers. StorageTek protested the compatibility
requirement as restrictive and creating a de facto specific
make and model procurement since no IBM equivalent DASDs are
compatible with IBM controllers. The protest was settled in
StorageTek's favor with the parties agreeing to an amendment
which would allow non-IBM vendors to offer substitute
controllers.
47. While pursuant to the Board's December, 1986,
order the restrictive language was stripped from the
solicitation, the school still managed to obtain its
preferred, IBM products. The school issued the solicitation
amendment on February 5,1987, but failed to send one to
StorageTek. Nor did the school inform StorageTek that the
amendment had gone out. On February 27,1987, the bidding
period closed and the contract was awarded to the only bidder-
-IBM.
48. The pro-IBM bias at the Postgraduate School has
also led school officials to solicit the IBM Corporation for
funds to support school activities. In February, 1986, IBM
provided requested funds. Several school officials were
involved in the establishment of an unauthorized bank account
for the IBM money and a foundation to handle these and other
funds. The IBM funds were used to support a workshop and
other official activities of the Naval Postgraduate School.
At least one Navy official failed to disclose his position
with the foundation in his annual Financial Disclosure Report
(SF-278).
49. One of the key officials at the Postgraduate
School involved in soliciting money from IBM was previously
employed by IBM for more than 20 years. This individual also
signed a consulting contract with IBM during the period in
which the solicitation and disbursement of IBM funds occurred.
It is not known whether this contract or a successor contract
is currently in effect. It is not known whether other
officials at the Postgraduate School have consulting contracts
with IBM. A subsequent investigation by the Navy Inspector
General found that the individual in question improperly used
his network of professional contacts at IBM for sponsorship of
official activities. The Inspector General's report states:
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... [the official involved] used his own network of
professional contacts and approached only IBM. It was
inappropriate for [the official] to limit his contacts and
make such an exclusive representation, and it was also
inappropriate [sic], under the circumstances to handle the
money from IBM without transferring it to the proper
accounting agency. Having thus acted, [the official's]
official activities were compromised with the perception
of the pursuit of private interests.
Report at 6. See Exhibit 1 to this complaint.
50. While the Inspector General did not find evidence
of criminal activity, the Navy IG did find violations of
Executive Order 11222 and numerous official instructions
issued by the Secretary of the Navy. The IG specifically
stated that the Postgraduate School's conduct in connection
with a workshop that was funded by IBM "resulted in or gave
the clear appearance of: (a) preferential treatment to IBM..."
51. This example illustrates the Postgraduate
School's tightly-knit relationship with IBM. It also reveals
that at least one highly-placed official at the school
maintained consulting arrangements with IBM at or about the
same time IBM was "competing" for contracts at the school. On
information and belief, the ongoing and pervasive ties between
IBM and school personnel has directly resulted in a pro-IBM
bias in developing specifications and performing technical
evaluations for the Postgraduate School's acquisitions.
52. The Postgraduate school's longstanding pro-IBM
bias has been allowed to flourish with the complicity of NRCC
Long Beach, the buying activity for the procurement at issue.
NRCC Long Beach has acted previously as a buyer for the
Postgraduate school in acquisitions of IBM hardware and
software under the IBM schedule. And NRCC Long Beach was also
the buyer in a biased IBM compatible procurement which it
conducted on behalf of the Naval Construction Battalion
Center--Port Hueneme. That procurement was the subject of
three GSA Board protests filed by VION Corporation which
proposed a NAS processor. The first two protests were
described in the third protest complaint filed December 20,
1988, as follows:
7. This is the third protest that VION has had to
file to compel the Navy to comply with the RFP's
requirements and applicable legal principles. In Case
No. 9602-P, VION protested against the NRCC's
determination that VION's proposal was nonresponsive.
NRCC subsequently withdrew that determination.
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8. In Case No. 9625-P, VION protested against NRCC's
issuance of an amendment to the RFP that so changed
the mandatory requirements that it would have made
VION's proposal nonresponsive. On the first day of
the hearing before Judge Stephen Daniels, NRCC agreed
to withdraw that amendment. NRCC also agreed not to
issue any further amendment to the RFP that would
affect the acceptability of VION's proposal.
53. The third VION protest was sparked by NRCC Long
Beach's blatantly illegal award of the contract to an alleged
minority firm called Aidant Corporation which had proposed IBM
equipment. Aidant's proposal was also higher priced than
VION's. The Navy made the award by applying an evaluation
preference for small disadvantaged businesses to the Aidant
bid which, by regulation, was inapplicable to the procurement
at issue. After the third VION protest, the NRCC Long Beach
finally relented and agreed to award the contract to VION.
The stipulation dismissing the protest states in part:
1. The Navy acknowledges that, under the RFP's
explicit terms and applicable legs principles, it
should have awarded the contract to VION (which
proposed NAS [National Advanced Systems] equipment)
and not to Aidant (which proposed IBM equipment)
because VION is the low priced, responsive offeror.
VION Corporation, GSBCA No. 9860-P, December 23,1988.
54. Clearly, NRCC Long Beach has neither the will nor
the ability to remove pro-IBM bias from its procurements.
Instead, this buying activity has been the willing tool of
Navy users who have abused procurement regulations to achieve
pre-ordained results.
55. Indeed, NRCC Long Beach has indicated that it
might even use the same ruse in this procurement that it used
less than five months ago to exclude VION's proposal. The
procurement at issue contains a clause permitting the
application of a small disadvantaged business evaluation
preference. As in the last VION protest, the application of
such a preference would be blatantly illegal since under
present law, the preference cannot apply to procurements
subject to the Trade Agreements Act. The procurement at issue
is clearly covered by the Trade Agreements Act. Although the
NRCC Long Beach was requested to remove the offending clause,
or at least indicate that the clause did not apply to this
procurement, it refused to do so.
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5. Violations of Statute and Relation.
56. For the reasons set forth above, the protested
procurement violates the Competition in Contracting Act
("CICA"), including 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304 (a) (1) (agencies must use
full and open competition) & (f) (1) (agencies must justify
sole source acquisitions) and 2305(a) (1) (agencies must
specify their needs in a manner designed to achieve full and
open competition), the Federal Acquisition Regulations
("FAR"), including FAR 6.101 (requirements for full and open
competition), 6.303 (requirements for sole source
justification) 10.002(a) (requirements for full & open
competition), 10.004(a) (requirements to establish
specifications in terms of actual minimum needs), 15.605
(requirements to use fair evaluation criteria), the Brooks
Act, 40 U.S.C. §759, including subsection (b) (agencies must
comply with DPA requirements ) & (g) (requirement to justify
sole source or make & model), and the Federal Information
Resource Management Regulations ("FIRMR") including FIRMR
Subpart 201-11 (requirements for full and open competition),
201-30.013 & 201-30.013-1 (preference for functional
specifications).
57. In addition, the Navy's use of unreasonably
restrictive specifications violates FAR 6.101, 10.002(a) &
10.004(a) and FIRMR 201-11.001(b), 201-11.002(b).
58. As set forth above, the Postgraduate school has
no demonstrated need for the items required by the restrictive
specifications described herein. Accordingly, these
requirements are unnecessary, in excess of the Government's
actual minimum needs, and violate FAR 6.101, 10.002(a) &
10.004(a) and 201-11.001(b) & 201-11.002(b).
59. Upon information and belief the solicitation was
restrictively drafted as a result of the Postgraduate school's
longstanding bias in favor of sole source IBM acquisitions and
against full and open competition, resulting in violations of
10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1) & (f) (1) & 2305(a) (1), FAR 6.101,
6.303, 10.002(a), 10.004(a), and FIRMR 201-11.
60. Upon information and belief, the Navy applied for
a DPA for this procurement but did not notify GSA that, for
all practical purposes, its solicitation was based upon a sole
source specification. Accordingly, the DPA issued by GSA was
based upon erroneous information and invalid. Therefore, the
Navy has violated the Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. §759(b) and (g).
In addition, on information and belief, the Navy has not
prepared sole source justifications required as a result of
the unreasonable restrictions alleged herein, which failure
violates 40 U.S.C. §759 (g) and FAR 6.303.
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61. The solicitation describes requirements in terms
of an IBM model or equivalent, but fails to set forth those
salient physical, functional, or other characteristics of the
referenced IBM products which are essential to the needs of
the Government. Accordingly, the solicitation violates FAR
10.004(b) and DFAR 210.004(b) (3).
WHEREFORE, PacifiCorp respectfully requests that the Board:
(1) Conduct a hearing to consider the suspension of the
Navy's procurement authority pending the Board's decision on
the merits of this protest;
(2) Suspend the Navy's procurement authority under the
solicitation pending a decision by the Board on the merits of
this protest;
(3) Conduct a hearing on the merits of this protest;
(4) Grant this protest on the merits, require the Navy to
revise the procurement specification as requested herein;
(5) To eliminate any recurrence of bias, require the Navy to
transfer the procurement to a different procuring activity and
to convene an unbiased technical panel with sufficient
expertise to review all specification changes required by this
protest or any future amendment, assure that such changes are
consistent with the requirements for full and open
competition, and to monitor the Navy's conduct during this
procurement to insure that all vendors are treated fairly.
(6) Suspend the procurement authority of NRCC Long Beach to
purchase products and services of the IBM Corporation unless
and until NRCC Long Beach demonstrates to the Administrator of
the General Services Administration that it is able to acquire
such products and services without bias or prejudice;
(7) Exclude from any involvement in the procurement of any
product or service which could be supplied by the IBM
Corporation all personnel of the Naval Postgraduate school
unless and until such personnel are able to demonstrate to the
Administrator of the General Services Administration that they
are able to acquire such products and services without bias or
prejudice;
(8) Award PacifiCorp its protest and proposal preparation
costs; and
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A. SUMMARY OF PROTEST ISSUES AND ACTION TAKEN BY NPS
Section(s) Issue Actions Taken
C.1.i-4 Background No Action Required
C.2.a.5-7 Vector Processor Never a RFP
(VP) Requirement
C.2.a.8-12 Bar to channel- Deleted from RFP
attached array
processors
C.2.a.13-24 Argonne Report Deleted from RFP.
and 30 MFLOPS Benchmark results
performance used to determine
performance levels
of new machine
C.2.b.25-30 ESA Schedule Never a RFP
Requirement
C.2.b.31 UNIX Requirement Deleted from RFP
C.2.c.32 ESA Engineering Misunderstanding






C.2.d.34 Migration path- Time table
evaluation time remained the same.
table Processor systems













Section(s) Issue Acticns Taken
C.3.40-41 Delivery dates for Vector processor
vector processor was never a
(VP) elements requirement in
RFP. However,
there was a clause
in the RFP which
stated that if VP
was bid, elements
must be deli' red
as prescribed by
schedule
C.4.42-47 BIAS-NSC (Oakland) No Action Required
concracts for - Information Only
3380s and 3840s
C.4.48-51 Computer Science No Action Required
Department - Information Only
Incident (NPS)
C.4.52-53 Other NRCC No Action Required
Protests (Non-NPS) - Information Only
C.5.56-61 Alleged violations No Action Required




ADP AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
ADPE AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT: Equipment
that is used in the automatic acquisition,
storage, manipulation, management, movement,
control, display, switching interchange,
transmission, or reception of data or
information by all federal agencies.
ADPSO AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING SELECTION OFFICE
APR AGENCY PROCUREMENT REQUEST
ASDP ABBREVIATED SYSTEM DECISION PAPER
ASN (S&L) ASSISTANT SECRETARY of the NAVY for
SHIPBUILDING and LOGISTICS
BAFO BEST and FINAL OFFER
BENCHMARK A routine or grouping of routines which are to
be run on several different computer
configurations in order to obtain performance
capabilities of various computer configurations
in order to obtain comparative performance
capabilities of various computer systems.
BROOKS BILL Public Law 89-306 passed in 1965 that names the
General Services Administration as the sole
procurement authority for automatic data
processing equipment. It is an act which
provides for the economic and efficient
purchase, lease, maintenance, operation, and
utilization of automatic data processing
equipment by the federal departments and
aaencies.
CBD COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY: Paper published every
working day by the Department of Commerce which
lists virtually every proposed DoD procurement
estimated to exceed $25,000. It also lists
major DoD prime contract awards that have
potential subcontracting opportunities.
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CICA COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT of 1984
CICS CUSTOMER INFORMATION CONTROL SYSTEM
CNO CHIEF of NAVAL OPERATIONS
DEERS DEFENSE ENROLLMENT ELIGIBILITY REPORTING SYSTEM
DMDC DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER
DoD DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE
DoN DEPARTMENT of the NAVY
DoN ADP AAP DEPARTMENT of the NAVY AUTOMATED DATA
PROCESSING ACQUISITION ASSESSMENT PANEL
DONIRM DEPARTMENT of the NAVY INFORMATION RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT
DPA DELEGATION of PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
EC ENGINEERING CHANGES
EPMAC ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CENTER
ESA ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE: New IBM 370
architecture operating system which consists of
MVS/SP Version 3 software combined with DFP
Version 3.1 software
FAR FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
FEDSIM FEDERAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION and MANAGEMENT
CENTER
FIPS FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
FIRMR FEDERAL INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
REGULATIONS
FY FISCAL YEAR
GAO GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
GB GIGABYTE
GSA GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSBCA GENERAL SERVICES Board of CONTRACT APPEALS
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HASC HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ICP INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS




LCM LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT
MB MEGABYTE
MENS MISSION ELEMENT NEEDS STATEMENT
MFLOPS MILLIONS OF FLOATING POINT OPERATIONS PER
SECOND
MIPS MILLIONS OF INSTRUCTIONS PER SECOND
MVS MULTIPLE VIRTUAL STORAGE
NAVAIRDEVCEN NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT
CENTER
NAVDAC NAVAL DATA AUTOMATION COMMAND
NAVPGSCOL NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NMPC NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL COMMAND
NPS NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
NRCC NAVAL REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTER
OEM ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER
PM PROGRAM MANAGER
POM PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM
RA REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
RFP REQUEST for PROPOSAL
SECAF SECRETARY of the AIR FORCE
SECDEF SECRETARY of DEFENSE
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SECNAV SECRETARY of the NAVY
SPAR STOCK POINT ADP REPLACEMENT
SWC SOFTWARE CONVERSION
SYSTEM A system is that combination of elements which
function together to produce the capabilities
required to fulfill a mission need
SYSTEMS
INTEGRATOR A firm which deal directly with procuring
federal agencies and subcontract with other
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